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RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS//APPELLEES'
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
For purposes of continuity, the following comments adhere to
the paragraph numbering found in LaSal Oil Company's ("LaSal")
Appellant's

Brief,

which

numbering

was

continued

in

Defendants/Appellee's ("Defendants," "insurers" or the "insurance
companies") brief.
42.

As further clarification of Dr. Pitt's testimony/ LaSal's

adds the following:
Defendants have quoted the testimony of Dr. Pitt, LaSal's
expert, concerning the leak in the section of pipe, Exhibit l-P
(Defendants' Brief at 4) . Dr. Pitt's testimony should be quoted in
full, however, in order to understand the import of his opinion:
The process that I visualize that occurred was that—from
the facts there were presented to me, is that the
corrosion likely occurred as a result of what we call
straight current corrosion, which is involved with
cathodic protection systems that are close to pipes, and
the corrosion process occurs as the current is flowing
through the pipe and various areas in the pipe.
The
metal goes into solution due to that corrosive current
and is lost from the surface of the pipe.
And in this case, it occurred in—the corrosion occurred
in a number of localized areas. The corrosion proceeded
to continue until at some point in time the metal was
thin enough to burst suddenly from the inside pressure of
the pipe. And in my opinion that is what caused at least
one of the holes present.
Q: Okay. Now, you say that it burst suddenly
the pipe caused by the—you have a corroded pipe
have pressure inside, and at some point because
pressure a hole was burst through it and suddenly
in that pipe?

through
and you
of that
created

A:
Simply the metal is not strong enough to hold the
interior pressure.
R. 3234-3235.
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44.

As clarification to the statement made by Defendants in

Paragraph 44 (Defendants7 Brief at 5-6) and the statements made by
the insureds' in their argument (Defendants7 Brief at 27-28), LaSal
adds the following:
According
testified that

to

Defendants,

Dr.

Alex,

Defendants'

expert,

ff

[i]n his opinion, this type of leak typically would

progress from simply moisture on the outside to drops forming in a
matter of days to weeks, and from a few drops to a gradual trickle
of gasoline over a matter of weeks to months." Dr. Alex's response
to Defendants' counsel's question is as follows:
Q: Typically do you have an opinion as to how long would
it take to get from the point where you have the initial,
as you said, osmotic process where its moisture on the
outside, to the time when you have drops forming? What
kind of time frame are you looking at? Can you give an
opinion as to that?
A:

Days to weeks.

R. 3271-3272.
The insurers further state (Defendants' Brief at 27-28) that
LaSal's

expert,

EarthFax

Engineering,

Inc.

("EarthFax") , "has

concluded that the onset of the gasoline release occurred sometime
between February, 1983 and September, 1984. . . . The pipe was not
uncovered and removed until approximately January 30, 198 6, when
the leak was located and repaired. (R. 3223.)"

This statement,

although correct, is taken out of context and does not present a
full

picture

of

the

nature

of

EarthFax's

analysis

and

the

underlying assumption that EarthFax was required to make by the
trial court.
In May, 1991, counsel for the parties presented oral argument
to the trial court on their motions for summary judgment.
- 2 -

After

reviewing the briefs, documentation and hearing oral argument, the
trial court expressed its concern regarding whether it could rule
on the issues of duty to defend and duty to indemnity when so
little was known about the timing of the alleged release of
gasoline at the LaSal Station.

Consequently, the trial court

requested that additional discovery be undertaken by LaSal in order
to ascertain both the timing of the release of gasoline and the
timing of property damage and/or personal injury to plaintiffs and
the State of Utah in the Underlying Actions.
In response to the trial court's request, LaSal's consultant,
EarthFax, reviewed

and analyzed available data and undertook

additional sampling in order to estimate the timing of a possible
gasoline leak at the LaSal Station.

The analysis assumed, for

purposes of that analysis only, that all of the hydrocarbon
contamination alleged in the Underlying Actions resulted solely
from the leak at the LaSal Station (R. 1630).l
Based on the assumptions (1) that the LaSal Station was the
sole source of hydrocarbon contamination in Moab, (2) that all
gasoline discharged from the LaSal Station was from the perforated
pipe found on the west side of the service station, and (3) that
gasoline from the perforated pipe reached the water table within a
few days, EarthFax concluded that the date on which the discharge
of gasoline commenced at the LaSal Station fell sometime between
February 1983 and September 1984 (R. 1630-1636, 1655-1656).

The

assumption used by EarthFax, namely, that LaSal was responsible for
1

EarthFax's analysis and conclusions are found in a report
entitled "Potential Timing of Hydrocarbon Leakage at LaSal Oil
Company," (the "1991 EarthFax Report"). (R. 1640-1663.)
- 3 -

all hydrocarbon contamination alleged in the Underlying Actions,
was required by the trial court even though LaSal steadfastly
maintained in defense of itself in the Underlying Actions that the
leak in the underground pipe, discovered in January, 1986, did not
contribute to the pollution of the groundwater in Moab.

Rather,

LaSal maintained that the hydrocarbon contamination complained of
in the Underlying Actions resulted from years of leaking pipes at
the Rio Vista Service Station (the "Rio Vista Station"), the other
named defendant in the Underlying Actions.

Furthermore, LaSal

claimed (and still claims) that it is just as likely that the leak
began a short time prior to its discovery in January 1986, and not
sometime between February 1983 and September 1984.

Consequently,

the fact that EarthFax estimated the initiation of the leakage as
falling sometime in 1983-1984 is in essence an artifice, and should
not be now used against LaSal by the Defendants to indicate that
there has been a steady leak for a two and one-half to three-year
period.
The following additional facts are relevant to this case:
45.

The underground lines at the LaSal Station connecting the

underground tanks with the dispensers, including the line in which
the leak was found, were maintained at a pressure of 25 to 3 0
pounds per square inch (pps) when the dispenser was switched off.
When the dispenser pump was switched on, the underground lines
(again, including the line in which the leak was found) were
subjected to between 40 and 45 pps (Testimony of C. Ray Klepzig,
owner of the LaSal Station, R. 3215).
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46.

Mr. Klepzig further testified that prior to finding the

leak, the LaSal Station inventory records had not reflected any
loss of product or any other factors that would have put him on
notice that he had a leak in an underground line or storage tank
(R. 3215-3216).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Under General Tenants of Contract Interpretation,
The Pollution Exclusion Should be Strictly
Construed Against the Insurers
For over thirty years the Utah Supreme Court has adhered to
the fundamental rule that "insurance policies should be strictly
construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured because
they are adhesion contracts drafted by the insurance companies.ff
U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993). In
Sandt, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its long-held position
regarding the one-sided nature of insurance contracts:
Normally, the details and provisions of the policy are
not discussed, except that the particular form of policy
is best suited to give the applicant the protection he
seeks. If he reads the policy he is generally not in a
position to understand its details, terms, and meaning
except that, in the event against which he seeks
insurance, the company will pay the stipulated sums. He
seldom sees the policy until it has been issued and is
delivered to him. He signs an application blank in which
the policy sought is described either by form number or
by a general designation, pays his premium, and in due
course thereafter receives, either from the agent or
through the mails, his policy. Many of its terms and all
of its defenses and super-refinements he has never heard
of and would not understand them if he read them. Such
fact is evident from the fact that cases like this arise
where lawyers and courts disagree as to what such
provisions mean. . . . For this reason the rule of

strictissimi
juris has been applied almost universally
to
insurance contracts,
and this jurisdiction,
like many
others, has declared in favor of a liberal
construction
in favor of the insured to accomplish the purpose for
- 5 -

which the insurance
premium was paid.
Id. at 522, citing
Utah

was taken

out

and for

which

the

Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 94

532, 72 P.2d

1060, 1073

(1937).

Under this

rule of

interpretation, "the insured is entitled to the broadest protection
that he could reasonably believe the commonly understood meaning of
its terms afforded him."

Id. at 523, citing

P.E. Ashton Co. v.

Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 162, 164, 406 P.2d 306, 308 (1965).
The

Sandt

construction

court

that

adduced

inconsistent

from

these

general

provisions, that

rules

of

is, separate

provisions which can be construed to afford coverage and at the
same time to exclude coverage, must be construed in favor of
coverage. As a corollary, according to the Sandt court, provisions
that limit or exclude coverage must be construed strictly against
the insurance company.

It therefore follows that any clause which

excludes or reduces liability must contain explicit language that
is clear to the insured and not just to those familiar with
insurance law, namely, lawyers, judges and insurers.

Id. at 524-

525.
Where the terms used in the policy "may be understood to have
two or more plausible meanings," those terms are a

fortiori

ambiguous. Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm Ins. Co. , 790 P.2d 581,
583 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

In the instant case, the insurers7

position regarding the interpretation of "sudden and accidental" in
the pollution exclusion, while arguably plausible to someone
trained in technical construction, is ambiguous when read by the
typical, reasonable insured.

This is clearly illustrated if one

compares the reasonable expectations of the insured in Gridlev
- 6 -

Assoc, v, Transamerica Ins, Co., 828 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
with those of LaSal. Moreover, the insurers' interpretation of the
pollution

exclusion

leads

to

wholly

irreconcilable

results,

depending upon the process whereby a containment vessel—such as an
underground storage tank or line—is breached; this, despite the
fact that the exception to the pollution exclusion says nothing at
all about the cause or process which results in a discharge.
POINT II
The Term "Sudden and Accidental11 Found Within
the Exception to the Pollution Exclusion
Is Not, as the Insurers Contend, "Clear"
LaSal's insurers, in response to LaSal's argument that "sudden
and accidental" is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning,
claim

that

ambiguity

under
exists

basic
in

rules
the

(Defendants' Brief at 10-12).

of

contract

phrase

"sudden

interpretation
and

no

accidental"

In essence, the insurers' primary

argument is that the "better reasoned cases," i.e., those whose
definition of "sudden and accidental" comports with the insurers'
position,

requires

that

"sudden"

have

a

temporal

element.

Furthermore, the insurance companies would have this Court reject
out of hand two lines of evidence which have been weighed by other
courts in determining whether coverage was afforded an insured
whose policy contains a "sudden and accidental" exception to the
pollution

exclusion:

the

existence

of

multiple

dictionary

definitions for the word "sudden," and the existence of extensive
judicial debate among jurisdictions over the meaning of the term
"sudden."

These two

lines of evidence, while arguably not

dispositive, are compelling evidence that ambiguity indeed exists
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in the phrase

"sudden

and

accidental," despite

the

insurers'

argument to the contrary.
In support of their position, the insurance companies point to
the analysis found in Newcastle County v. Hartford Accident and
Indem. Co. , 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1991) wherein the Third Circuit
reasoned

that

conflicting

precedent

and

the

multiplicity

of

dictionary definitions of the word "sudden" might not render that
term ambiguous.

Nevertheless, the Third Circuit concluded that

under Delaware law the phrase "sudden and accidental" was in fact
ambiguous.
"dictionaries

Thus,

even

define

though

words

in

the
the

Third

Circuit

abstract,"

it

stated

that

nevertheless

concluded that "sudden" had more than one reasonable definition:
The district court simply began its analysis by doing
that which any reasonable person would do: it looked the
word up in the dictionary.
Upon discovering that
Webster's dictionary offers several definitions of the
word "sudden," the district court quite reasonably
concluded that this suggests that the "word has more than
one reasonable definition."
Id. at 1194. Furthermore, the Third Circuit, in acknowledging that
two contrasting lines of cases exist, stated that "we cannot help
but view such a division as at least suggesting that the term
"sudden" is susceptible of more than one reasonable definition."
Id. at 1196.
. LaSal's

insurers also direct this Court's attention to a

number of recent cases wherein the term "sudden and accidental" has
been interpreted to be unambiguous.

See, e.g., Hartford Accident

and Indem. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th
Cir. 1992), cert,

denied,

El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Hartford

Accident and Indem. Corp., 113 S.Ct. 411 (1992); Anaconda Minerals

- 8 -

Co,

v. Stoller Chemical Co. , 990 F.2d

1175

(10th Cir.

1993);

Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins, Corp., 1993
W.L. 241520 (Fla. July 1, 1993); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. ExCell-0 Corp., 702 F.Supp. 1317, 1324 (E.D. Mich. 1988), quoted

in

Hartford, 962 F.2d at 1498, n. 6.
These cases, however, are factually distinguishable from the
case at bar because the pollution in question involved routine
discharges

that

operations.

were

part

of

the

insureds'

regular

These discharges were also continuous

business

insofar as

"continuous" signifies that the releases of pollutants happened
over

and

over

knowledge.2

again

on

an

ongoing

basis

with

the

insureds'

In Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity

and Guar. Co. , 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992), for example, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District
Court

for the District

of Utah which

found

that

"sudden

and

accidental" in the pollution exclusion meant "occurring without
notice and happening by chance."

Id. at 1486 (emphasis added).

In

Hartford, the pollution at issue was the disposal of used PCBs by
"routinely draining the contaminants directly into the ground or
periodically draining them into concrete sumps, which were later
pumped out into dirt pits.

Some pits contained pipes designed to

discharge any waste overflow directly into the surrounding ground."

2

The term "continuous" is, unfortunately, as ambiguous as the
term "sudden," when used in the context of describing both the
release of pollutants and the pollution itself. Thus, "continuous"
may refer to a single event of uninterrupted duration or to a
series of spatially/temporally related events as, for example, "a
continuous series of blasts; a continuous row of warehouses." See,
Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 440 (2d ed. 1987);
The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 910 (1971).
- 9 -

Hartford Accident and Indem. Co, v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. ,
675 F.Supp. 677, 679 (D. Utah 1991).
The insurer in Hartford argued that this regular, repeated
discharge of waste materials over a period of years could not be
interpreted as "sudden and accidental." The district court agreed,
holding that the deliberate and repeated business practice of
disposing of contaminants "did not occur without notice and by
chance."

Id. at 680.

In so holding, the district court rejected

the line of cases which interpreted "sudden and accidental" to mean
"unexpected and unintended," but was silent as to whether "sudden
and accidental" had a temporal aspect.

Under the district court's

analysis in Hartford (whereby it found that "sudden and accidental"
meant "happening without notice and occurring by chance"), the leak
at the LaSal

Station would

necessarily

be deemed

"sudden

and

accidental" because it too happened "without notice and by chance."
Similarly, in Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chemical Co.,
Inc.. 773 F.Supp. 1498 (D. Utah 1991), aff'd,

990 F.2d 1175 (10th

Cir. 1993) , at issue was liability for the cleanup of flue dust
used in the manufacturing operations of Stoller's predecessor.
Flue dust was released and disbursed

in the regular course of

unloading, transporting and processing the flue dust.

Moreover,

waste materials were dumped in a pit south of the manufacturing
facility and exposure to the elements regularly affected the piles
of flue dust and waste material on the property.

Other materials

were transported to the plant site as part of experiments to see if
they were usable in fertilizer products and, when the experiments
proved unsuccessful, these products were dumped in waste piles at

- 10 -

the site.

The trial court found that there was "nothing even

remotely 'sudden' about ongoing and regular polluting events" at
the manufacturing site.

Id. at 1505.

See also. Fireman's Fund

Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 702 F.Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988)
(day-to- day manufacturing practices, tank spillage and ruptured
pipes which contaminated the groundwater were expected by the
manufacturer and therefore held not to be "sudden and accidental");
Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 1993
W.L. 241520 (Fla. July 1, 1993) (placement of waste oil sludge in
unlined storage ponds from which chemicals then leached into the
soil and groundwater, along with other polluting events, held not
to be "sudden and accidental").
It is clear that the "sudden and accidental" language in the
exception to the pollution exclusion is subject to at least two
reasonable, alternative interpretations depending upon whether a
pollutant has been discharged from a containment vessel without the
knowledge or intent of the insured or whether it has been knowingly
released through a series of day-to-day activities in the regular
course of the insured7s business. The problem of interpreting the
term "sudden" arises, at least in part, because the insurance
industry

has

used

"sudden"

in

insurance

policies

issued

to

manufacturers who, in the every day course of their businesses,
intentionally and knowingly release pollutants to the environment,
as well as in policies issued to companies, such as LaSal, who have
valuable product in containment vessels which pollute, if released
inadvertently into the environment. The problem in interpretation,
therefore, rests squarely on the insurance industry which should

- 11 -

have chosen a less "slippery" word to cover fundamentally distinct
types of events•

Having chosen the word "sudden" which, depending

upon the particular context, is reasonably susceptible to more than
one interpretation, including "unexpected" and "unintended," the
term must be construed against the insurers.

In the instant case,

"sudden" must be construed against Omaha and Carriers, and in favor
of LaSal to provide coverage for the release of gasoline at the
LaSal Station.
POINT III
The Trial Court Erred When It Held That the Release of
Gasoline From LaSal's Underground Line Was Not Sudden
Even assuming the term "sudden" has a temporal aspect, the
trial court nevertheless erred in holding that the release at the
LaSal Station was not "sudden."

This necessarily follows from the

Gridley court's correct interpretation of the term "sudden" as
requiring merely that the initiation of the discharge itself be
sudden in order to fall within the exception to the pollution
exclusion, irrespective of the length of time which elapses prior
to discovery of a leak.
828 P.2d at 527.

Gridley Assoc, v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,

See also, Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident

Ins. Co. of America, 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d

831 (1993); Claussen v.

Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686 (1979);
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus.. Inc., 4 07
Mass. 675, 555 N.E.2d 568, (1990), cert,

denied,

U.S.

,

112 S.Ct. 969 (1992).
LaSal's

insurers,

on

the

other

hand,

contend

that

interpretation of the term "sudden" turns on distinctions among the
causative processes which lead to a breach in a containment vessel.
- 12 -

The insurers/ disingenuous focus on the cause of the leak rather
than the initial discharge is no more than an ill-disguised attempt
to divert the Court's attention from the fact that the exception to
the pollution exclusion concerns the release, not the process
resulting in the release•

According to the insurance companies,

the cases to which this Court should look "distinguish between
differing causes of leaks as a means of deciding the true nature of
leaks," that is, whether they are sudden or not (Defendants' Brief
at 19)(emphasis added).
which

occurs

over

a

Under the insurers' approach, a process

lengthy

period

of

time,

as

for

example

corrosion, results in a gradual release whereas a process which
occurs over a shorter period of time results in a sudden release.
According to this reasoning, the initial discharge of gasoline from
the Gridley pipe was "sudden" whereas the initial discharge from
the LaSal pipe was not. (Defendants' Brief at 16-18) .

From this

perceived distinction in causative processes, the insurers conclude
that LaSal has no insurance coverage, whereas Gridley was afforded
coverage.
A.

This analysis is flawed.
Any Attempt to Distinguish the Facts in Gridley From the
Facts Now Before This Court Leads to Irreconcilable
Results.

In relating the facts in Gridley, this Court stated:
The uncontroverted fact before the district court was
that the break in the gasoline line was a "clean break"
that "would have had to have been caused by an adjustment
of the area in which it is in." No evidence was ever
presented that the break was caused by corrosion or
deterioration which would have resulted in a gradual drip
or trickle of gasoline from the line.
Id. at 527.
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The facts in Gridlev, LaSal respectfully submits, are somewhat
more

complex.

The

importance

of

this

complexity,

while

not

apparent to this Court when the decision in Gridlev was announced,
is significant when the Court is faced with construction of the
same

exception

to

the

pollution

variation on the facts.
in Transamerica's

exclusion

but with

a

slight

According to the statement of facts found

Brief

in Gridley,3 the

"leak

occurred

in a

section the pipe which had been weakened by the gradual process of
electrolysis" (Transamerica Brief at 6 ) .
According

to

the

testimony

of

Billie

Gene

Hankins,4 who

apparently was the only witness to testify as to the break in the
fuel line at the Gridley station, approximately 25% to 30% of the
pipe had been corroded away (Hankins Deposition at 41-42).

Hankins

testified that the corrosion would have weakened the pipe prior to
the event which

caused

the final rupture, thereby making

the

corroded pipe more susceptible to damage than an uncorroded pipe
(Hankins Deposition at 51-52) . Hankins further testified that the
final break in the pipe "would have to have been caused by an
adjustment of the area in which it is in.
to have moved that area."

Something would have had

(Hankins Deposition at 9.)

The broken

line, according to Hankins, was located only a few inches below
newer lines which were not broken.

Hankins testified that the

3

A copy of relevant portions of Defendant/Appellant
Transamerica Insurance Company's Brief in Gridley v. Transamerica
Ins. Co. is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" (the "Transamerica
Brief").
4

A copy of the Deposition Transcript of Billie Gene Hankins
(the "Hankins Deposition") taken in Gridlev v. Transamerica Ins.
Co. is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." The Hankins Deposition was
attached as Exhibit G to the Transamerica Brief.
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ruptured pipe was definitely the older of the pipes.

This opinion

was based on Hankins's observation of the amount of corrosion
present on the broken pipe in contrast to the absence of corrosion
on the "newer" pipes (Hankins Deposition 41-42, 48, 53). Hankins
opined that the final event which ruptured the line was caused by
some type of earth movement as, for example, heavy equipment or an
earthquake.

Thus, although the break is characterized as a "clean

break" by the Gridley court, it is clear from the evidence before
the trial court that the line in which the break appeared was also
heavily corroded.

It is significant, therefore, that the lines

adjacent to and above the broken line—lines which were not broken
by the hypothesized earth movement—were not corroded.
Gasoline leakage from the broken pipe at the Gridley station
occurred

over a period

of several months, during which

quantities of gasoline were released.

large

The summary of records of

gasoline loss was:
November,
December,
January,
February,

1985
1985
1986
198 6
TOTAL

(Transamerica

Brief

at 5) .

485
4,770
4,742
1,877

gallons
gallons
gallons
gallons

11,839 gallons
From

these

records, the

insured

surmised that the initial break occurred in late November, 1985.
The break was repaired in early February, 1986.5

(Gridley Brief at

6.)
A comparison of the facts in Gridley with the facts now before
this Court

illustrate

that Defendants' position

5

is untenable.

Relevant portions of Plaintiff/Appellee's brief in Gridley
is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" (the "Gridley Brief").
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Although the final breach in the line at the Gridley station was
apparently due to earth movement, the pipe which ruptured had been
subject to the process of gradual corrosion.

Had this pipe not

been corroded, it, like the adjacent lines, would not have been
ruptured

by

the

hypothesized

earth

movement.

It

follows,

therefore, that the line in question at the Gridley station was
subjected to the same gradual processes of corrosion as the line at
the LaSal

Station.

Had

the

line

at the

LaSal

Station

been

subjected to some sort of earth movement which cracked the line in
the same place where the corrosion occurred, and if this crack had
occurred only one day prior to the day when the release of gasoline
actually occurred, under Defendants' theory the release would have
been "sudden and accidental," thereby falling within the exception
to the pollution exclusion.
The

indefensibility

of

Defendants'

position

is

further

illustrated by comparing the quantities of gasoline released at the
Gridley station and at the LaSal Station.

It is undisputed that

nearly 12,000 gallons of gasoline were lost during the two and onehalf month period prior to discovery of the leak at the Gridley
station.

The insured in Gridley, consequently, was on notice at

least since the beginning of December, 1985, that it had a major
leak.

Nevertheless, the insured did not attempt to find and fix

the leak until February, 1986.

Under LaSal's insurers' theory,

because the rupture in the Gridley line is characterized

as a

"clean break," the insured in Gridley falls within the exception to
the pollution exclusion despite the fact that the insured had been
on notice for several months regarding the presence of a leak and
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regardless of the fact that nearly 12,000 gallons of gasoline were
lost. In contrast, under Defendants' analysis, because the rupture
at the LaSal Station is characterized as a "corrosive" leak, LaSal
does not fall within the exception to the pollution exclusion even
though it had no record of gasoline shortages prior to discovery of
the leak, LaSal acted immediately to find and fix the leak as soon
as there was evidence of a leak and gasoline losses were so minute
they had not been detected.
The flaw in the insurers' position is further illustrated by
their attempt to distinguish Wagner v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co.,
427 N.W.2d 854 (Wis.Ct.App. 1988), review

denied,

436 N.W.2d 30

(Wis. 1988) from the case now before this Court.

According to

Defendants, Wagner, like Gridley, is distinguishable because the
gasoline leak began "immediately" after an underground line was
cracked in 1981.

As noted by the Wagner court, the underlying

facts were not well developed; accordingly, the amount of released
gasoline is not found in the opinion.

The leak was discovered

approximately three years after the presumed initiation of the
release

when

properties.

gasoline

odors

were

detected

on

surrounding

Given these facts, although concededly not known, it

is reasonable to assume that the initial volume of gasoline
released from the cracked line was minuscule; hence, the failure to
discover the pollution for some three years.

It is likely,

therefore, that the broken line in Wagner initially resulted in "a
gradual drip or trickle."

Gridley v. Transamerica, 828 P.2d at

527. Thus, the distinction drawn in Gridley between a release from
a "clean break," which the Gridley court apparently presumed
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necessarily results in an initial release of large volumes of
gasoline, and a release from a "corrosion break," which the court
presumed to result in a "gradual drip or trickle," does not in fact
exist.
The likely scenario in Wagner is thus in sharp contrast to
that in Gridlev despite the fact that both apparently
clean breaks.

involved

In Gridley significant amounts of gasoline were

initially lost within the first few months after the line ruptured,
whereas initial losses in Wagner were apparently small.

These

factual differences between Wagner and Gridley with respect to
total amounts released, rate of release and duration of release
prior to discovery illustrate precisely why the cause of a rupture,
the initial volume released, and the duration of the release are
irrelevant

to

a determination

as

to whether

the

release

was

"sudden."
B.

The Proposition That "Gradual is the Opposite of Sudden"
Is Both Incorrect and Irrelevant.

LaSal's insurers contend that because "gradual is the opposite
of sudden," any discharge from an underground gasoline line caused
by corrosion of the pipe is gradual, not sudden.

Although the

juxtaposition of "gradual" and "sudden" is, on its face, clever,
this is a false dichotomy.6
According to this "gradual-versus-sudden" analysis, LaSal's
reasoning leads to unacceptable results—at least in the view of

6

The term "gradual," of course, is found nowhere in the
definition of "occurrence" or in the pollution exclusion of the CGL
policies at issue. (See R. 2146 for the Omaha pollution exclusion
and definition of "occurrence" and R. 2023, 2078 for the Carriers
pollution exclusion.)
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the insurers, the clear implication being that any such logical
analysis will somehow upset the cosmic balance with inevitable
tragic consequences.

(Defendants' Brief at 18-19).

Nevertheless,

under any logical analysis of the "sudden and accidental" exception
to the pollution exclusion it is incontestable that: (1) the length
of time for the process (whatever that process may be) to create a
rupture in a containment vessel from which pollutants are released
is irrelevant as to whether the release is "sudden," (2) the volume
of pollutants released is irrelevant as to whether the release is
"sudden," (3) the duration of time between initiation of the leak
and discovery of the leak is irrelevant as to whether the release
is "sudden," and (4) whether the damages occur immediately after
the release or gradually accrue over a period of time is irrelevant
as to whether the release is "sudden."

The sole pertinent inquiry

is whether the release itself was "sudden."

It therefore follows,

as LaSal's insurers correctly observe, that an initial release from
a containment vessel is always, as a matter of law, "sudden."

The

fact that this logical analysis leads to what the insurers contend
is an "unacceptable" conclusion is the insurers's problem, not
LaSal's.

It is, after all, LaSal's

insurers who drafted

the

pollution exclusion.
The

fact

that

unexpected

and

unintended

releases

from

containment vessels may all be "sudden" does not mean that all
releases of pollutants are "sudden and accidental," nor does it
necessarily eliminate the temporal component from "sudden."

As

recognized by numerous courts, routine, day-to-day discharges of
pollutants which are part of the insured's business operations are
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neither sudden nor accidental.

See, e.g., Anaconda Minerals v.

Stoller Chemical Co., 773 F.Supp. 1498 (D. Utah 1991), aff'd,

990

F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993); Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v.
aff'd,

U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 675 F.Supp. 677 (D. Utah 1991),
962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992).

Thus, the insurers' ominous

prediction that LaSal's argument will eviscerate the meaning of
"sudden" is a red herring.
Controversy

surrounding the interpretation

of "sudden and

accidental" has been exacerbated by decisions wherein the courts
have

used

the word

"gradual"

separate, distinct notions:

imprecisely,

thereby

conflating

the process resulting in a rupture of

a containment vessel, the initial discharge of pollutants from the
vessel, the duration of the discharge and the damages resulting
from the discharge of pollutants.
The decision in ALC Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property
and

Casualty

Ins. Co., 17 Cal.App.4th

(1993), petition

for

review

denied,

1773, 22 Cal.Rptr. 206
Cal.Rptr.

1993) , cited by LaSal's insurers, exemplifies this problem.

(Cal.
In ALC

Technologies, the court failed to distinguish between pollution of
the environment—which may be gradual—with
duration of a discharge.

the initiation and

This confusion is illustrated by the

following quotations:
[The] "sudden and accidental" language in the CGL
pollution exclusion does not allow for coverage for
gradual pollution.
Id. at 212 (emphasis added)(cited in Defendants' Brief at 21).
[T]he release of contaminants was a result of holes in
the tanks which developed over time as a result of rust.
Corrosion is, by definition, a gradual process.
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Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
Similarly#

in Shell Oil v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co. , 12

Cal.App.4th 715, 15 Cal.Rptr. 2d 815 (1993) (cited by both LaSal
and by the insurers) , the court at one point found that "sudden"
refers

to

the

commencement

of

a

discharge.

Id.

at

841.

Nevertheless, the Shell court stated that,
If a sudden and accidental discharge continues for a long
time, at some point it ceases to be sudden or accidental.
. . Still, a sudden and accidental discharge of a
dangerous pollutant could continue unabated for some
period because of a negligent failure to discover it,
technical problems or a lack of resources that delay
curtailment, or some other circumstance. Liability from
such an event could well be covered.
15 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (citation omitted).
It

is

clear

that

the

Shell

court

struggled

with

the

distinction between the initial discharge of pollutants and the
possibility that the discharge might continue for a lengthy period
of time.

Thus, although the Shell court agreed with Lumbermens

Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 407 Mass. 675, 555
N.E.2d 568, 572 n. 6 (1990), cert,

denied,

S.Ct.

refers

969

(1992)

that

"'sudden'

U.S.
to

the

, 112

pollution's

commencement," the Shell court did not adequately come to grips
with the problem of the duration of a release.7
7

The insurers attempt to distinguish three additional cases
cited by LaSal:
Goodman v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. , 412
Mass. 807, 593 N.E.2d 233 (1992); Petr-All Petroleum Corp. v.
Fireman's Ins. Co., 593 N.Y.S.2d 963 (N.Y.App.Div. 1993); and
Colonie Motors, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 538
N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y.App.Div. 1989). Without belaboring the points
raised above in LaSal's discussion of ALC Technologies and Shell,
LaSal merely notes that the decisions in Goodman, Petr-All and
Colonie Motors lend further credence to LaSal's observation that
courts have had considerable problems in dealing with the sudden
and accidental exception to the pollution exclusion. The insurers'
statement that "[t]he Goodman decision is consistent with Wagner
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Under any logical analysis of the "sudden and accidental"
exception to the pollution exclusion, it is inescapable that the
salient inquiry is whether the release was "sudden." The insurance
companies attempt to characterize the leak at the LaSal Station as
gradual because the corrosive process leading up to the release was
gradual is irrelevant.

The volume of pollutants released, the

duration of time until discovery of the leak and the damages caused
by the leak are equally irrelevant to whether the release itself
was "sudden and accidental."

This Court should hold that the

release

LaSal

of

gasoline

at

the

Station

was

"sudden

and

accidental."
C.

The Fact the Rupture in LaSal's Pipe Resulted From
Corrosion is Irrelevant to Determining Whether the Leak
Was "Sudden"

The insurers contend that the inception of the leak at the
LaSal

Station

occurred

sometime

between

February,

September, 1984 (Defendants' Brief at 27-28).
LaSal, supra

1983

and

As pointed out by

at 2-4, EarthFax's calculations regarding the date of

onset of the leak must be placed in context.

EarthFax's conclusion

that the onset of the leak occurred sometime between February, 198 3
and

September,

1984,

is

based

entirely

on

the

hypothetical

presumption that all of the gasoline pollution in the Moab area
came solely from the LaSal Station.
holes in LaSal's underground

Given the small size of the

line and the fact that

inventory

and Gridley in differentiating between a gradually developing leak
through corrosion and one which is abrupt and immediate"
(Defendants' Brief at 25) underscores the analytical problem. It
is not the leak which gradually develops through corrosion but,
rather, the weakening of the pipe walls which gradually develops
through corrosion. Once the leak begins, irrespective of the cause
and the initial volume, it is sudden."
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records for the month immediately preceding discovery of the leak
indicated no loss of product, it is likely (as LaSal has always
maintained) that the rupture occurred much more recently

than

September, 1984.
As the insurers correctly point out, both LaSal and Omaha
presented expert testimony from two metallurgists regarding the
condition of the pipe segment which ruptured.

Both Dr. Pitt and

Dr. Alex agreed that the pipe segment had been subjected to general
and pitting corrosion, the result of which was the thinning of the
pipe wall at the base of the thread roots to the point where the
pipe failed at these thinned areas (R. 3236, 3253).
According to the testimony of Dr. Pitt, LaSal's expert, the
release of gasoline at the LaSal Station was sudden:
. . . The corrosion proceeded to continue until at some
point in time the metal was thin enough to burst suddenly
from the inside pressure of the pipe. And in my opinion
that's what caused at least one of the holes present.
Q: Okay. Now, you say that it burst suddenly through
the pipe caused by the — you have a corroded pipe and
you have pressure inside, and at some point because of
that pressure the hole was burst through it and suddenly
created in that pipe?
A:
Simply the metal is not strong enough to hold the
interior pressure.

Q: But prior to the failure, gasoline was moving through
that pipe with no leakage?
A:

That's right.

Q:
(By Mr. Hansen) Do you have an opinion to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty as to whether
or not, prior to the event that you just described, there
was a leak in that pipe?
Calls for a "yes" or "no"
answer.
- 23 -

A:

Yes.

Q:

Okay.

What is that opinion?

A: My opinion was that there was no leak prior to the
one that occurred at that time.

A: If the pipe were not under pressure, I believe the
leak would also have been sudden because at one instance
it's there and in the next instance it's not. It's not
there and then it's there.
R. 3235-3238.
Dr. Alex, the insurers' expert, further testified as follows:
Q:
Now, before there was a failure in that piece of
pipe, before there was a failure, would it hold water or
gasoline?
A:

Yes, it would.

Q:
And after the failure it wouldn't hold water or
gasoline, right?
A:

That is correct.

Q: And it is true, isn't it, that at one point in time
that piece of pipe would hold gasoline? It was a good
containment unit, right?
A:

That is correct.

Q:
And at some point
containment unit, right?
A:

in

time

it

wasn't

a

good

That is correct.

R. 3289.
According to the testimony of both experts, at one moment in
time, the underground gasoline line at the LaSal Station was intact
and at the next moment, when a small opening appeared, it was not.
Only one logical conclusion may be drawn from this testimony:

if

a containment vessel at one point in time has integrity, that is,
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it is intact, and at the next moment its integrity is destroyed
thereby releasing pollutants, the event in question can only be
characterized as "sudden."

One can only conclude that the release

at the LaSal Station was "sudden."
CONCLUSION
The release of gasoline at the LaSal Station falls within the
exception to the pollution exclusion irrespective of whether the
term

"sudden"

is

susceptible

to

more

than

one

reasonable

interpretation or whether the term "sudden" is found to have a
temporal component.

If the phrase "sudden and accidental" means

"unintended or unexpected," the release of gasoline at the LaSal
Station was accidental

and was neither

intended

nor expected.

Because the language in question is reasonably susceptible to more
than one interpretation, it must be construed against Omaha and
Carriers and in favor of LaSal to provide coverage for the release
of gasoline. Alternatively, if the term "sudden" is deemed to have
a temporal component, it is undisputed that the initial discharge
of gasoline occurred immediately or "suddenly."

It is irrelevant

that the process whereby the initial fracture appeared was caused
by erosion; similarly the length of time which elapsed between
discovery of the discharge, the volume of the discharge, the rate
of discharge and the time which elapsed
contaminate
release

the

environment

itself was

are

for the discharge to

irrelevant

"sudden and accidental."

as

to whether

the

Accordingly, the

gasoline release falls within the "sudden and accidental" exception
to the pollution exclusion.

This Court must hold that both Omaha

and Carriers have a duty to defend and to indemnify LaSal in the
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actions brought against it by the State of Utah and by Hartford
Leasing Corporation.
DATED this 1st day of March, 1994.
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1

I.

JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in the

present case pursuant to Utah Code Ann, Section 78-2a-3
(1953, as amended).

II.

ISSUE FOR REVIEW
The issue presented on appeal is whether the gradual

damage caused by a gasoline line leak is barred from
coverage by the pollution exclusion contained in an
insurance policy

issued to Plaintiffs and Appellees

Gridley Associates, Ltd., Petroleum Management, Inc., and
Vernon G. W. Dickman (hereinafter "Gridley Associates11)
by

Defendants

Company

and

(hereinafter

Appellant

Transamerica

"Transamerica11) .

Insurance

There are no

issues of material fact disputed by the parties.

III. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Transamerica seeks a review of the entry of partial
summary judgment by the trial court below.

Under the

standard of review for conclusions of law, the Court of
Appeals should accord the trial court's conclusions "no
particular deference, but review them for correctness."
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

IV.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
No constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,

or regulations are determinative of this appeal.

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

appeal

arises

from

an

insurance

coverage

dispute between Transamerica and Gridley Associates.
Gridley Associates filed the instant action seeking
insurance coverage from Transamerica for liability they
faced arising from a gasoline leak.

Transamerica then

filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking
judgment on Gridley Associates' Claims for Relief for
breach of contract and declaratory relief.
issue raised

The only

in Transamerica's motion was that the

pollution exclusion in its policy precluded coverage of
Gridley's claim.

(Affidavit of Eric Olson, Exhibit A in

the Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, page 3,
paragraph 7; Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit
B in the Addendum filed concurrently with this brief,
Motion pages 1-2). The trial court, basing its ruling
upon undisputed facts, held the leak was "sudden and
accidental" under its interpretation of those terms and
accordingly denied Transamerica's Motion.

(Affidavit of

Eric Olson, Exhibit A in the Addendum filed concurrently
with this brief, page 4, paragraph 9; Minute Order,
Exhibit C in the Addendum filed concurrently with this
brief.)
In response to the trial court's ruling, the parties
entered into a Settlement Agreement and Release whereby
Transamerica agreed to pay a certain sum toward cleanup
of the site of the leak, while Gridley Associates agreed
to dismiss their causes of action for bad faith, fraud,
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and negligent misrepresentation.
provided that

The Agreement also

in the event the agreed-upon sum was

insufficient to pay for the cleanup, Transamerica would
have the option of notifying Gridley Associates of its
intent

to

appeal

the

pollution exclusion.

trial

court's

ruling

on

the

(Affidavit of Eric Olson, Exhibit

A in the Addendum filed concurrently with this brief,
page

5, paragraphs

10-11; Settlement

Agreement

and

Release, Exhibit D in the Addendum filed concurrently
with this brief, page 7, paragraph 3.)

This provision

came into effect upon Transamerica's payment of the full
agreed amount, and Transamerica exercised its option,
notifying Gridley Associates that it intended to appeal
the ruling.

To place the action in a posture from which

it could be appealed, the parties stipulated to a Partial
Summary Judgment, entered by the trial court on December
13, 1990. Specifically, the parties stipulated to entry
of judgment in Gridley Associate's favor as to the two
Claims for Relief for breach of contract and declaratory
relief.

(Affidavit of Eric Olson, Exhibit A in the

Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, pages 5-6,
paragraph 12; Record at 593-94, Stipulation; Record at
595-97, Partial Summary Judgment.)

The Partial Summary

Judgment is a final order, entry of which disposed of the
case.

Transamerica now appeals from that Judgment as

planned.
The undisputed facts pertinent to this appeal are
essentially as set out in Transamerica's Motion for
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Partial Summary Judgment. For all relevant time periods,
Gridley Associates owned a self-service gasoline station
in Gridley, California ("the Gridley station").
at 200, paragraph 9, Amended Complaint.)

(Record

From February

7, 1985 through March 7, 1986, the Gridley station was
covered by a policy of insurance issued by Transamerica
("the Policy").

(Record at 199-200, paragraphs 6-7,

Amended Complaint; Record at 342, paragraph 3, Affidavit
of Michael Dean ["Dean affidavit"].) The Policy provided
coverage for liability arising from injuries to third
persons in three different sections:

(a) Section II —

Comprehensive General Liability ("CGL") (schedule B), (b)
Section III —
Section V —

Garage Insurance (schedule F), and (c)
Commercial Umbrella Policy Declaration.

(Record at 342, paragraph 4, Dean affidavit.)

With

respect to the CGL and Commercial Umbrella coverages, the
Policy contained the following exclusion:
This insurance does not apply:

to bodily injury or property damage
arising out of the discharge,
dispersal, release or escape of
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids,
alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or
gasses, waste materials or other
irritants,
contaminants
or
pollutants into or upon the land,
the atmosphere or any water course
or body of water; but this exclusion
does not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is
sudden and accidental.
(Record at 342, paragraph 5, Dean affidavit.)
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With respect to the Garage Insurance, the Policy
contained the following exclusion:
This insurance does not apply to:
•

• •

Bodily injury or property damage
caused by the dumping, discharge or
escape of irritants, pollutants or
contaminants. This exclusion does
not apply if the discharge is sudden
and accidental.
(Record at 343, paragraph 6, Dean affidavit.)

This

quoted language together with that quoted above from the
CGL and Commercial Umbrella coverages are hereinafter
referred to collectively as "the pollution exclusion."
For the months of November 1985 through February
1986,

the

Gridley

station

recorded

the

following

shortfalls between the volume of regular leaded gasoline
purchased and placed in its underground storage tank and
the volume of such gasoline actually sold:
November 1985
December 1985
January 1986
February 1986

485
4,770
4,742
1.877

TOTAL

gallons
gallons
gallons
gallons

11,839 gallons

(Plaintiffs' Answers and Objections to Defendant's Second
Set of Interrogatories, Exhibit E in the Addendum filed
concurrently with this brief, pages 6-7, No. 9, and Tank
Inventory Summary attached thereto.)
In early February, 1986, Gridley Associates engaged
Dockendorf Equipment Co. ("Dockendorf") to locate any
leak in the regular leaded fuel system at the Gridley
station

that
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for

the

shortfalls.

(Deposition of Calvin Clifton Bolley, Exhibit F in the
Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, page 7.)
Dockendorf proceeded to test the regular leaded fuel
system at the Gridley station.

Dockendorf determined

that

a pipe connecting a

gasoline had

gasoline

storage

leaked
tank

gasoline dispensers.

from

and

submerged

pump

with

the

(Deposition of Billy Gene Hankins

["Hankins deposition"], Exhibit G in the Addendum filed
concurrently with this brief, pages 8, 38-39, 47-48.)
The leak occurred in a section of the pipe which had been
weakened

by

the

gradual

process

of

electrolysis.

(Hankins deposition, Exhibit G in the Addendum filed
concurrently with this brief, pages 49-52.)

Gasoline

would flow out of the leaking area of the pipe only when
the fuel system was activated to pump gasoline thereby
putting pressure on the line.

The leakage would stop

when the pump was not activated and pressure was taken
off the gasoline line. (Hankins deposition, Exhibit G in
the Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, pages
10-11.)

On or about February

12, 1986, Dockendorf

repaired the leak in the gasoline line at the Gridley
station.

(Hankins deposition, Exhibit G in the Addendum

filed concurrently with this brief, page 6.)
In March, 1986, large quantities of gasoline were
discovered on property adjacent to the Gridley station.
(Record

at

201,

paragraph

10,

Amended

Complaint.)

Gridley Associates were ordered by governmental agencies
to clean up the gasoline on the adjacent property. They
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undertook to do so by hiring America
Management Corporation.
Amended Complaint.)

Environmental

(Record at 201, paragraph 11,

The City of Gridley and Nevada

Construction & Mining filed actions against plaintiffs
Vernon G. W. Dickman and Gridley Associates, Ltd., to
recover damages allegedly caused by the gasoline leakage.
These

actions have been

settled.

(Record

at 202,

paragraph 15, Amended Complaint; Plaintiffs' Answers and
Objections to Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories,
Exhibit E in the Addendum filed concurrently with this
brief, 1-2, No. 1(2)).

VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The sole issue facing the Court of Appeals is the

interpretation of the pollution exclusion's "sudden and
accidental" language.

Although Gridley Associates have

indicated that they intend to argue that Transamerica is
estopped from raising the pollution exclusion as a ground
for coverage, that is not an issue in this appeal.

The

trial court below ruled solely on the issue of the
pollution exclusion based on undisputed facts. In order
for the Court to consider the issue of estoppel, it would
have to act as a fact finder, which is clearly outside
its appropriate role.
The Court should adopt an interpretation of the
pollution
subject
nx

exclusion which precludes coverage of the

claim.

To say what we

all know,

namely,

sudden' means %sudden,'" is not meant to be funny but

rather is meant to point out that the plain meaning is
obvious. A "plain meaning" approach to interpreting the
insurance policy at issue is appropriate under Utah
principals of contract interpretation. The plain meaning
of the phrase "sudden and accidental" includes a temporal
element, requiring that the discharge of pollutants,
rather than the cause of the discharge or the resulting
damage,

happen

abruptly.

Where

contaminants

are

discharged on a continual, intermittent basis in the
course of regular business, as in the present case, such
discharge is plainly not "sudden." Certainly such facts
do not succeed in carrying the insured's

burden of

proving that the discharge was "sudden and accidental."
Moreover, by so interpreting the exclusion, the
Court would be in keeping with the rule of construction
that all parts of a contract should be given effect where
possible.

If the word

"sudden" is interpreted

as

synonymous with "accidental," then it becomes meaningless
surplusage in the phrase "sudden and accidental."
Such an interpretation of the pollution exclusion is
supported by the holdings of the majority of courts
across the country, particularly the more recent of such
holdings. No appellate court has ruled on this issue in
Utah. A federal district court sitting in Utah, however,
has recently addressed this issue and has ruled in
accordance

with

Transamerica.
value,

it

interpretation

proposed

by

Although this case has no precedential

does
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show

a

-8

trend

toward

the

proper

interpretation of the pollution exclusion, particularly
in Utah.

The Court of Appeals should adopt reasoning

similar to that of all these cases and rule that the leak
at the Gridley station is not covered by the Policy.

VII. ARGUMENT
A.

The Leakage at the Gridlev Station Was Not a
"Sudden Discharge" and Thus Is Not Covered
Under the Policy.

The relevant facts regarding the leak at the Gridley
station are not in dispute.

The loss claimed resulted

from the intermittent discharge of gasoline into the
ground in the vicinity of the Gridley station over a
period

of approximately

four months.

Further, for

purposes of this appeal, Transamerica does not dispute
that the alleged loss was an "occurrence" under the
Policy

or

that

the

discharge

was

"accidental."

Similarly, Plaintiffs must concede that the gasoline leak
at the Gridley station falls within the terms of the
pollution exclusion absent application of the conditional
language regarding a "sudden and accidental" discharge.
The simple issue before the Court is whether the leak at
the Gridley station was a "sudden discharge."
1.

The Court Should Use a Plain Meaning
Approach to Interpret the Terms of the
Policy.

As the relevant facts are undisputed, the issue of
whether the leak at the Gridley station was a "sudden
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discharge" is one of contract interpretation for the
Court.

See Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991).

In determining the meaning of "sudden," the Court should
be

guided

by

general

principles

recognized by Utah courts.

of

interpretation

As stated by Utah's Supreme

Court, "[u]nless there is some ambiguity or uncertainty
in the language of an insurance policy, the policy should
be enforced according to its terms." St. Paul Fire and
Marine Insurance v. Commercial Union Assurance. 606 P.2d
1206, 1208 (Utah 1980) (footnote deleted).

That court

has also held that "all of [a contract's] parts should be
given effect insofar as that is possible."

Larrabee v.

Roval Dairy Products Co.. 614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980).
See also Marriott v. Pacific National Life Assurance Co..
24 Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981 (1970).

Most importantly,

policy language should be given "its usual and ordinary
meaning."

Fire Insurance Exchange v. Alsop. 709 P.2d

389, 390 (Utah 1985).

As the Utah Supreme Court stated

in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Dennis. 645 P.2d
672,

675

(Utah 1982) quoting

from Jamestown Mutual

Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 266
N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410, 416 (1966):
In
the
construction
of
contracts, even more than in the
construction of statutes, words
which are used in common, daily,
non-technical speech, should, in the
absence of evidence of a contrary
intent, be given the meaning which
they have for laymen in such daily
usage, rather than a restrictive
meaning which they may have acquired
in legal usage.
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See also Fuller v. Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045,
1047 (Utah 1985) ("words are to be given their ordinary
meaning11).
2.

The

Pollution

Coverage

of

Exclusion

Non-Sudden

Precludes

Discharges

of

Pollutants.
The

pollution

provisions:

exclusion

contains

two

basic

(1) an exclusion from coverage of all claims

arising out of the "discharge, dispersal, release or
escape" of pollutants of any kind; and (2) a narrow
exception to the exclusion that preserves coverage only
where such polluting discharges (not the damage or injury
resulting from such discharges) are both "sudden" and
"accidental." The language of the pollution exclusion is
simple and straightforward, and leaves no room for any
suggestion of "ambiguity." Moreover, when the exclusion
is read in the context of the entire policy, there can be
no question as to its meaning and effect.
arises

If a claim

out of the discharge^ of waste materials

or

contaminants, it falls within the ambit of the pollution
exclusion

and

is excluded

from coverage unless the

exception to the exclusion applies.

As noted, that

exception provides that
this exclusion does not apply if
such discharge[, dispersal, release
or escape] is sudden and accidental.
To show that such a claim falls within the exception to
the pollution exclusion, therefore, an insured must show

both that the relevant discharge was accidental and that
it also occurred suddenly.
Transamerica's

position

on the meaning

of the

pollution exclusion is that the word "sudden" describes
an

abrupt,

brief,

instantaneous

discharge.

This

definition has been adopted by numerous courts that have
analyzed

the

meaning

pollution exclusion

of

the word

"sudden"

in the

language now before this Court.

Granted, some early decisions viewed

"sudden" to be

ambiguous, construing it against the insurer to find
coverage. Others, finding no ambiguity, equated "sudden"
with

"unexpected"

or

"unintended"

thus

making

it

synonymous with "accidental."1 However, in recent years,
the majority

of decisions have held that the word

"sudden" as used in the pollution exclusion is neither
ambiguous nor superfluous.2

It is this authority which

Transamerica asks the Court to follow.

*A helpful summary of these two lines of authority
is set forth in International Minerals & Chemical Corp.
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 168 111. App. 3d 361,
522 N.E.2d 758, 765-66 cert, denied. 122 111. 2d 576, 530
N.E.2d 246 (1988)•
^his trend is recognized and discussed in Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co. v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp.. 702 F. Supp. 1317,
1326 (E.D. Mich. 1988). A comprehensive list of current
case law on the pollution exclusion is attached as
Exhibit H hereto.
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a.

The

Exception

to

the

Pollution

Exclusion Applies to the Discharge
of Pollutants.
The terms "sudden and accidental" clearly describe
the discharge of pollutants rather than the cause of such
a discharge or the damage experienced.

This is in

contrast to the "occurrence" requirement which states
that the damage must be neither expected nor intended.
In a well-reasoned decision by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, the court discusses this distinction as
follows:
The sudden event to which the
exception in the pollution exclusion
clause applies concerns neither the cause
of the release of a pollutant nor the
damage caused by the release. It is the
release of pollutants itself that must
have occurred suddenly, if the exception
is to apply so as to provide coverage.
The exception thus focuses on the
circumstances of the release.
In
deciding whether there was an occurrence,
on the other hand, the focus of the
inquiry is on the property damage, asking
whether it was expected or intended from
the insured's point of view. Courts that
have
failed
to
appreciate
this
distinction have led themselves to
identify an ambiguity in the policy
language that does not exist.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville Industries, Inc.,
407 Mass. 675, 679, 555 N.E.2d 568, 571 (1990). See also
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals. Inc..
856 F.2d 31 (1988) ("It must also be emphasized that the
focus of this * sudden and accidental' exception to the
general pollution exclusion clause is on the nature of
the discharge of the pollution itself, not on the nature

of the damages caused"); Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies v.
Ex-Cell-0 Corp.. supra. 702 F. Supp. at 1326-27 (E.D.
Mich. 1988) ("The focus of the pollution exclusion is on
the

discharge

environment.

or
When

release
the

of

pollutants

discharge

or

into

release

the
of a

pollutant is brief or lasts only a short time, it comes
within the meaning of the first element of the *sudden
and accidental' exception of the pollution exclusion.");
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co.,
693 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (damage caused by a
"gradual release/1 etc., is excluded), aff'd.

875 F.2d

868 (6th Cir. 1989); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes. 77
Or. App. 136, 711 P.2d 212 (1985), review denied. 301 Or.
76, 717 P.2d 631 (1986) (the pollution exclusion focuses
upon the discharge of pollutants, not upon the resulting
damage or injury); Waste Management of Carolinas. Inc. v.
Peerless Ins. Co.. 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (the
pollution exclusion precludes any coverage obligation
where discharges had occurred repeatedly "over the course
of time," focusing upon the polluting event itself — the
discharge of pollutants —

rather than on any resulting

injury or damage or its cause), reh'g denied. 316 N.C.
386, 346 S.E.2d 134 (1986).
b.

The Term "Sudden" Means the Opposite
of "Gradual".

Some courts claim that the word "sudden" within the
exception is itself ambiguous. The plain, common, daily,
non-technical meaning of "sudden" is not ambiguous.
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In

"daily usage,M "sudden" denotes an abrupt or precipitous
event. As the Sixth Circuit stated in USF&G v. Star Fire
Coals, supra. 856 F.2d at 34 (6th Cir. 1988):
We do not find the pollution
clause
to
be
riddled
with
ambiguities despite the best efforts
. . . to create them. • • .
We believe the everyday meaning
of the term "sudden" is exactly what
this clause means.
We do not
believe that it is possible to
define "sudden" without reference to
a temporal element that joins
together conceptually the immediate
and the unexpected.
That court recently reiterated its understanding of the
term "sudden" in FL Aerospace v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co..
897 F.2d 214, cert, denied.
112 L.Ed.2d 238 (1990).

U.S.

, 111 S. Ct. 283,

The court held that the plain,

everyday meaning of "sudden" is "happening . . . quickly,
without warning, unexpectedly; abrupt."

Id. at 219.

Accordingly, "a sudden and accidental event is one that
happens quickly, without warning, and fortuitously or
unintentionally."

Id.

Accord Grant-Southern Iron &

Metal Co. v. CNA Ins. Co.. 905 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1990).
A federal court sitting in another Tenth Circuit
state has recently come to a similar conclusion.
held:
As commonly used, the meaning of
"sudden" combines both the elements
of without notice or warning and
quick or brief in time. . .
Sudden connotes "a temporal aspect
of immediacy, abruptness, swiftness,
quickness, instantaneousness, and
brevity."

It

United States Fid, & Guar, Co, v. Morrison Grain Co.. 734
F. Supp. 437, 446 (D. Kan. 1990) (citing C, L, Hauthavav
& Sons v. American Motorists Ins,, 712 F. Supp. 265, 268
(D. Mass. 1989)).
The court in International Minerals. supra, 522
N.E.2d

at 769

(111. 1988),

explained this temporal

requirement even more fully, holding as follows:
••[Sadden11 is understood in its
ordinary, most common and popular
sense,
to
have
a
temporal
significance. Webster's dictionary
defines
"sudden" as
"happening
without previous notice or with very
brief
notice; "
"abrupt" ;
"characterized by and manifesting
hastiness"; (Webster's Third New
International
Dictionary,
2284
(1976)); and we decline to ignore
these temporal-focused definitions
or hold that because the word might
also have other contextual uses, it
is ambiguous and thus must be
interpreted to provide coverage
where the policy language read as a
whole clearly intends to exclude
such coverage.
The Ex-Cell-0 court similarly declared:

"*[S]udden' in

the pollution exclusion includes the temporal component
of briefness, and means *brief, momentary, or lasting
only a short time.'
*gradual.'"

*Sudden' is to be contrasted with

702 F. Supp. at 1326 (footnote omitted).

The Second Circuit court has also very recently
adopted this plain meaning of "sudden."

Rejecting the

insureds' argument that the "sudden and accidental"
exception should be interpreted to mean "unexpected and
unintended," the court held that "[f]or a release or
discharge to be sudden, it must * occur [] over a short
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period of time.'11
924

F.2d

39,

42

Oaden Corp, v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
(2d

Cir.

1991)

(citing

Technicon

Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co. . 141 A.D.2d
124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), aff'd, 74
N.Y.2d 66, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 542 N.E.2d 1048 (1989)).

A

district court in this circuit has similarly held in a
recent opinion that "the word * sudden/ implies a temporal
element. Thus an event which lasts for an extended period
of time is not xsudden.'••

Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of

North America. No. 84 Civ. 1968, slip op. at 13 (S.D.N.Y.
April 23, 1991) (available on Westlaw at 1991 WL 63420).
The court further recognized that such an interpretation
••is in keeping with the emerging majority view among the
courts."

Id.

In American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host
Corp.. 667 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987) , motion to vacate
denied. 120 F.R.D. 129 (D. Kan. 1988), aff'd. No. 88-1053
(10th Cir. March 21, 1991), the insured cited cases in
support of the contention that the pollution exclusion
was "ambiguous.M

After reviewing these authorities, the

court wrote:
The
Court
has
carefully
considered these and similar cases,
yet
cannot
conclude
that
the
pollution
exclusion
clause
is
ambiguous.
The language is clear
and plain, something only a lawyer's
ingenuity could make ambiguous.
Id. at 1429.

The General Host court went on to summarize the
interplay between the definition of "occurrence" in the
policies and the pollution exclusion itself:
The
contract
is
clear:
"occurrences," as def ined, are
covered unless the occurrences arise
out of pollution events; those are
not covered unless such pollution
events are sudden and accidental.
Read as a whole, the policy covers
"continued and repeated exposures"
except for exposures to pollution;
then it covers only "sudden and
accidental" events.
The Court
declines to contort the plain
language of the policy.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Civ. 1968, slip op. at 8.

Accord Olin, supra, No. 84
Declining the insured's

invitation to "contort the plain language of the policy,"
the General Host court applied the "clear and plain"
terms of the pollution exclusion, and held that the word
"sudden" is "objective" and requires that, to be covered,
the polluting discharge must occur "on brief notice" and
not "gradually or over an extended time."

Id. at 1428.

See also Waste Management v. Peerless, supra, 315 N.C. at
699, 340 S.E.2d at 382 (1986) ("[t]he exception also
describes the event —

not only in terms of its being

unexpected, but in terms of its happening instantaneously
or precipitantly"); Lower Paxton Township v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. , 383 Pa. Super. 558, 577, 557
A.2d 393, 402 (1989) ("[t]o read ^sudden and accidental'
to mean only unexpected and unintended is to rewrite the
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policy by excluding one important pollution coverage
requirement —

abruptness of the pollution discharge").3
c.

The

Term

"Sudden"

is

Not

Superfluous.
To read

"sudden" to mean only

"unexpected" or

"unforeseen" would violate the maxim that every part of
a contract be given effect.
P.2d 160 (Utah 1980).

See Larrabee, supra. 614

As the court in International

Minerals. supra. 522 N.E.2d at 769 (111. 1988), observed:
[IInterpreting
"sudden"
as
"unintended and unexpected" renders
it synonymous with "accidental," as
that term is employed in the policy
and thus, the word "accidental" can
be read out of the exception as
nothing
more
than
redundant
surplusage. Such a reading does not
comport with fundamental rules of
contract construction requiring that
to the extent possible, all words
used in a contract be given effect.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts agreed with this
reasoning, stating that:
For the word "sudden" to have any
significant purpose, and not to be
surplusage
when
used
generally
in
conjunction with the word "accidental,"
3

The history of the pollution exclusion underscores
that the term "sudden" was used in the exception to the
exclusion precisely to differentiate abrupt, isolated
discharges of pollutants, for which coverage might exist,
from those that occurred continuously or repeatedly over
a period of time, and for which coverage was excluded.
See generally Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause
Through the Looking Glass. 74 Geo. L.J. 1237 (1986) . The
EPA itself acknowledges the distinction. In pollution
insurance regulations promulgated under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §S 6921 et seq.,
the EPA has thus defined the term "sudden accidental
occurrence" as "a[] [polluting event] which is not
continuous or repeated in nature."
40 C.F.R.
S 265.141(g) (emphasis added).
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it must have a temporal aspect to its
meaning, and not just the sense of
something
unexpected.
We
hold,
therefore, that when used in describing a
release of pollutants, "sudden" in
conjunction with "accidental" has a
temporal element. The issue is whether
the release was sudden. The alternative
is that it was gradual.

. . . If the word "sudden" is to
have any meaning or value in the
exception to the pollution exclusion
clause, only an abrupt discharge or
release of pollutants falls within the
exception.
Lumbermens v. Belleville, supra, 407 Mass. at 679-81, 555
N.E.2d at 571-72 (1990).

See also Great Lakes Container

Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.. 727 F.2d 30 (1st
Cir.

1984) (words "sudden11 and "accidental" have plain,

discrete, and readily ascertainable meanings, rejecting
the argument of ambiguity); Technicon v. American Home.
supra, 141 A.D.2d at 533, N.Y.S.2d at 97 (1988)

("a

discharge of toxic waste could take place accidentally
over an extended period of time but . . . there would be
no coverage since the discharge was not

*sudden'");

Techallov Co, v. Reliance Insurance Co.. 338 Pa. Super.
1, 487 A.2d 820, 826-27 (1984) ("the language of the
policy

unambiguously

states that

there will

be no

coverage for toxic discharge into the environment unless
that discharge is both sudden and accidental"); Lower
Paxton v. USF&G. supra, 393 Pa. Super, at 577, 557 A.2d
at 402 (1989) ("Reading *sudden' in its context, i.e.
joined by the word *and' to the word * accident', the
inescapable
c:\pk*dinji\5294\«ppbric/jD0C
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that

*sudden',

even

if

including the concept of unexpectedness, also adds an
additional element because *unexpectedness' is already
expressed by *accident'. This additional element is the
temporal meaning of sudden, i.e. abruptness or brevity") .
The cases discussed above are only some of the most
recent

to

reject

the

"ambiguity"/"superfluousness"

arguments and to give effect to the pollution exclusion
in cases of repeated or continuous discharges of wastes.
Other courts similarly have concluded that the pollution
exclusion means what it says, and that it excludes
coverage except in those cases where polluting discharges
were truly "sudden" as well as "accidental." See, e.g.,
Borden Inc. v. Affiliated F.M. Insurance Co.. 682 F.
Supp. 927, 930 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (pollution exclusion "is
clear

and

should

not be twisted

simply

to provide

insurance coverage when the courts deem it desirable"),
aff'd.

865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1989), cert, denied.

U.S.

, 110 S. Ct. 68, 107 L.Ed.2d 35 (1989); Becker

Electronics Mfg. Corp. v. Granite State Ins. Co.. No. 86CV-1294 (N.D.N.Y. June 12, 1989) (available on Westlaw at
1989 WL 63671) (citing New York v. Amro Realty Corp. . 697
F. Supp. 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) for unambiguous reading of
"sudden

and

accidental"

such

that

"sudden"

means

happening on very brief notice whereas "accidental" means
happening unexpectedly). These views are, of course, in
accord with black-letter Utah law providing that courts
should not strain to create an ambiguity where none
exists.

See, e.g.. Overson v. United States Fidelity &
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Guaranty Co. , 587 P.2d 149 (Utah 1978).

Those courts

following this rule have had no trouble understanding and
applying the simple language of the exclusion.
3.

A Federal Court Sitting in Utah Has Very
Recently

Agreed

Interpretation

Transamerica/s

With
of

the

Pollution

Exclusion.
On February 28, 1991, the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, issued
its opinion in Hartford Ace. & Indem. Corp. v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., No. 88-C-1051J (available at 5
Mealey's Lit. Rep., Insurance (Mealey) No. 18, 3/12/91,
at B-l).

In a coverage dispute between Hartford and its

insured, the coxirt granted summary judgment for Hartford
on the basis of the pollution exclusion.

In agreement

with the arguments presented herein, the court noted
that:
The courts adopting the plain
and simple definition of sudden and
accidental have uniformly found the
regular and repeated- discharge of
waste to be excluded from coverage
by the pollution exclusion. . . .
Likewise, this court finds that
[the
insured's] continuous and
routine discharge of pollutants upon
or into the ground cannot be
construed as sudden and accidental.
Id. at 7, 5 Mealey's No. 18 at B-4.

In reaching this

conclusion,
the court emphasize[d] that the
focus of the sudden and accidental
exclusion clearly related to the
nature of the "discharge, dispersal,
release or escape" of the pollution
c:\pkadi*t\5294\appbrief.mot
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itself, not to the nature of the
damages caused.
[The insured's]
claim that the damages were sudden
and accidental mischaracterizes the
relevant question before the court.
The
focus
of
the
pollution
exclusion, by its plain terms, is on
the polluting discharges.
If the
discharge
is
not
sudden
and
accidental,
the
exclusion
is
applicable and the resultant injury
or damage is not within policy
coverage.
Id. at 8, 5 Mealey's No. 18 at B-4.
disagreed

with

any

argument

that

The court directly
the

"sudden

and

accidental" language was ambiguous. The court cited Star
Fire Coals, supra, 856 F.2d at 34, for the contention
that that language "is clear and plain, something only a
lawyer's ingenuity could make ambiguous. . . .

It's

strange logic to perceive ambiguity in this clause."
Hartford

at

9.

While the Hartford

case holds no

precedential value in the instant action, in the absence
of any Utah state appellate authority regarding the
interpretation of the pollution exclusion, this Court
should consider the Hartford case persuasive authority
and should follow the rule cited therein.
By following the Hartford case, the Court of Appeals
would join the swelling ranks of those courts performing
a genuine interpretation of the policy language before
them.

Transamerica urges the Court of Appeals to follow

this line of reasoning, accepting at face value the plain
and clear language of the policy at issue.
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4.

The Pollution Exclusion Bars the Instant
Claim.

The loss for which Gridley Associates seek recovery
resulted

from a discharge of gasoline that was not

"sudden." Over a period of four months, from pipe at the
Gridley station which had suffered denigration caused by
the electrolytic process, fuel leaked into the soil
surrounding the Gridley station as the gasoline pump was
activated.

(See supra pages [4-5]) . It was not any one

of these minor discharges, standing alone, that caused
injury to the adjacent property.

Rather, it was the

cumulative effect of countless such periodic discharges
that

produced

liability

for

the

contamination

which

Transamerica must answer.

Gridley

and

accompanying

Associates

insist

However, this loss did not

result from a "sudden discharge" as those words are
commonly used. The leak occurred every time the pump was
activated, and stopped every time the pump was turned
off.
The pollution at the Gridley station occurred over
the

course

of

several

months

as

part

of

Gridley

Associates' business operations. As such, the discharge
of pollutants was not "sudden and accidental" as required
for coverage.

In fact, in Industrial Indem. Ins. v.

Crown Auto Dealerships, 731 F. Supp. 1517 (M.D. Fla.
1990), the court found that the pollution at issue, which
was very similar to the pollution at the Gridley station,
had occurred gradually and as a normal result of the
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insured's business operations. The insured in that case
had presented evidence that:
a number of accidental
overflows
occurred
during
the
filling of the used oil holding
tanks, some of which resulted in
fairly large spills. . . . There
were also occasional spills due to
leak hose and pipe connections. . .
Also despite our efforts to
impress on our employees the need
for safety at all times, occasional
carelessness by employees resulted
in accidental spills during the
transfer of used oil from trucks to
storage tanks.
Id. at 1521.

In upholding the pollution exclusion, the

court held that:
. . . [t]hese spills and leaks
appear to be common place events
which occurred in the course of
daily
business,
and
therefore
cannot, as a matter of law, be
classified
as
"sudden
and
accidental."
That
is, these
"occasional accidental spills" are
recurring events that took place in
the usual course of [business].
Id.
Moreover, although the insurer nominally bears the
burden of showing that the exclusionary language in the
pollution exclusion is applicable, the exception to the
exclusion is in substance a grant of coverage, and the
insured thus bears the burden of proving that exception.
Courts have so held specifically with respect to the
insured's burden to prove the "sudden and accidental"
exception in the pollution exclusion.

Fischer & Porter

Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.. 656 F. Supp. 132, 140
(E.D. Pa. 1986).
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Ins. of Wausau, No. C901330SC, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Cal.
April 16, 1991)

(available at 5 Mealey's Lit. Rep.,

Insurance (Mealey) No. 24, 4/23/91, at E-l, E-2) ; Detrex
Chemical Industries. Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau,
746 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Northern Ins.
Co. v. Aardvark Associates, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 379 (W.D.
Pa. 1990); Covenant Ins. Co. v. Friday Engineering Co..
742 F. Supp. 708 (D. Mass. 1990); A. Johnson & Co. , Inc.
v. The Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 741 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass.
1990), affid#

No. 90-1753

(1st Cir., May 14, 1991);

Fireman/s Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp., supra, 702
F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988), motion for rehearing
denied, 720 F. Supp. 597 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Bora-Warner
Corporation v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. 88-539 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. February 1, 1991); 19 Couch on Insurance,
Section 79:385

(2d Ed. 1983).

Accordingly, Gridley

Associates bears the burden of proving that the discharge
of fuel was both "sudden" and "accidental" so that the
exception to the exclusion comes into play.

In other

words, the main body of the pollution exclusion clearly
applies to this claim. The damage at issue arises out of
the discharge of pollutants; Transamerica has shown this
without dispute from Gridley Associates.

Transamerica

has therefore met its burden of proof, and this burden
has now shifted to Gridley Associates.

The pollution

exclusion applies unless Gridley Associates can convince
the court that the facts lift this claim out of the
exclusion.
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As explained above, the facts presented do not meet
this burden.

The only facts regarding the discharge of

fuel show that the release of contaminants at the Gridley
station occurred over a number of months.

No evidence

exists that the fuel was release in a sudden episode. In
the

normal

course

of

Gridley

Associates'

business

operations, customers on innumerable occasions activated
the gasoline pumps to dispense fuel. Time after time, on
a daily basis, gasoline ran through the system, gradually
leaking out bit by bit through the leak in the pipe into
the surrounding soil.
This is the Industrial Indemnity case. A continuous
series of releases, even if one in isolation may be
considered sudden, becomes not sudden, i.e., gradual, and
excluded.

Inventory

records

kept

by

the

insured

certainly show an ongoing, long-term process ignored by
the insured, leading to the large amount of oil going
into the ground over a significant period of time.

The

pollution exclusion should not be emasculated so as to
compensate the insured in contravention of the policy's
clear language, especially in light of the insured's
failure to reasonably and properly respond over such a
longer period of time.

Hence, as a matter of law,

coverage of the loss at the Gridley station is excluded
under the Policy.
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B.

The Interpretation of the Pollution Exclusion
is the Only Issue in this Appeal,

Gridley Associates have indicated that they intend
to argue on appeal that Transamerica is estopped from
raising the pollution exclusion.

The estoppel argument

has no merit on appeal and is not properly before the
Court of Appeals.

The sole issue to be decided is the

interpretation of the pollution exclusion.
1.

The Trial Court Ruled Upon the Sole Issue
of the Applicability

of the Pollution

Exclusion.
Transamerica moved the trial court for Partial
Summary Judgment on the sole ground that "each policy
under which plaintiffs might

seek coverage

for the

gasoline leak . . . contained a pollution exclusion
limiting coverage arising from such leaks to those caused
by a * sudden and accidental' discharge.11

(Affidavit of

Eric Olson, Exhibit A in the Addendum filed concurrently
with this brief, page 3, paragraph 7; Motion for Partial
Summary

Judgment,

concurrently

with

Exhibit
this

B

in the

brief,

Addendum

Motion

pages

filed
1-2.)

Appropriately, the trial court based its ruling on that
very issue:
The Court's decision turns on
its interpretation of the contract
document and the definition of the
term "sudden" as used in the
pollution exclusion of the insurance
policy.
.
.
.
[U]nder
the
uncontroverted facts concerning the
gasoline leak the Court finds that
it was accidental and sudden within
the meaning of the policy and does
c:\pkadiw\S294\appbri6f^
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not
come
under
the
pollution
exclusion as defendant contends.
(Affidavit of Eric Olson, Exhibit A in the Addendum filed
concurrently with this brief, page 4, paragraph 9; Minute
Order, Exhibit C in the Addendum filed concurrently with
this brief.)
As a result of this ruling and the structure of the
parties' Settlement Agreement and Release (Exhibit D in
the

Addendum

filed

concurrently

with

this

brief),

Transamerica stipulated to a Partial Summary Judgment:
That the gasoline leak . . • is
covered under . . . the subject
insurance
policy
issued
by
Transamerica. . • .
(Affidavit of Eric Olson, Exhibit A in the Addendum filed
concurrently with this brief, pages 5-6, paragraph 12;
Record

at

595-97,

Partial

Summary

Judgment.)

Accordingly, the court entered

judgment

for Gridley

Associates on their causes of action for breach of the
insurance contract and declaratory relief, the First and
Sixth Claims for Relief, respectively.
While Gridley Associates argued that Transamerica is
estopped

from

denying

coverage

Plaintiffs' Memorandum

(Record

in Opposition

at 366-451,

to Motion

for

Partial Summary Judgment), the trial court declined to
reach that issue, presumably for the simple reason that
it had no need to do so.

Only if the court had agreed

with Transamerica that the policies did not cover the
gasoline leak would it have needed to determine if a
question existed as to whether Transamerica was estopped
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from asserting this non-coverage.

Instead the court

ruled that the policies did cover the leak; it therefore
did not need to rule on the other issues raised by
Gridley Associates. As such, the court never reached nor
ruled upon the issue of estoppel.
2.

Estoppel Is Not an Issue in this Appeal.

As agreed in the Settlement Agreement and Release,
Transamerica appeals the Partial Summary Judgment that
the policy covers the gasoline leak on the sole ground
that the pollution exclusion within the policy bars such
coverage.

(Affidavit of Eric Olson, Exhibit A in the

Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, page 5,
paragraph 11; Settlement Agreement, Exhibit D in the
Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, pages 7-8,
paragraph 3.)

Transamerica anticipates that Gridley

Associates will argue, however, that Transamerica is
estopped from denying coverage on this ground, calling
such argument an alternate basis to affirm the trial
court's ruling.

This is an inaccurate characterization

of the posture of this case.

This appeal concerns

whether, under the terms of the policy, the pollution
exclusion applies to preclude coverage.

This was the

issue decided by the trial court. Questions of estoppel
have absolutely no bearing on this matter of contract
interpretation.

Estoppel

is

a

separate,

quasi-

contractual issue, relevant on remand only if this Court
determines that the pollution exclusion does apply.
Moreoever, an argument that an insurer is estopped from
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

2

STATE OF UTAH

3

-oOo-

4
5
6

GRIDLEY ASSOCIATES, LTD.,
a Utah limited partnership,
PETROLEUM MANAGEMENT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
VERNON G. W. DICKMAN,

9

DEPOSITION OF BILLY GENE
HANKINS

Plaintiffs,

7

e

Civii No. C-88-1317

vs.
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE
COMPANY,

10

Defendant.
11

-oOo12
13

BE IT REMEMBERED, that on Tuesday, December 6, 1988,

14

commencing at the hour of 1:05 p.m., the deposition of

15

Billy Gene Hankins, called as a witness on behalf of the

16

plaintiffs, was taken pursuant to stipulation and pursuant

17

to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, before Ronald F.

IB

Hubbard, notary public and certified shorthand reporter in

19

and for the State of Utah (License No. 32), at 139 East

20

South Temple, Suite 2001, Salt Lake City, Utah.

21

That there were present as counsel:

22

For plaintiffs:

23
24
25

Stephen B. Mitchell
Attorney at Law
139 East South Temple *2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 355-6677
and

Holly S. Burgess
Attorney at Law
Smylie & Selman
Two Century Plaza, Suite 2050
2049 Century Park East
Los Angeles, CA 90067-2592
Telephone: (213) 553-3758
For defendant:

Eric C. Olson
Attorney at Law
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall &
McCarthy
50 South Main, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84414
Telephone: 532-3333

That the witness was duly sworn before examination
to testify to the truth, the whole truth, ana nothing but
the truth.
-oOo-
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1988, 1:05 P.M.
-oOo-

2

BILLY GENE HANKINS

3
4

called as a witness en behalf of the plaintiffs,

5

being first duly sworn by the notary, testified

6

as follows:
EXAMINATION BY MR. MITCHELL

7
B

0

Will you please state your full name and home

9

address.

10

A

11

95926.

12

0

Are you employed, sir?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Where are you employed?

15

A

I have a part-time employment with Duratest Lighting

16

Corporation.

17

Q

I also understand you're under some kind of a disability^

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

You used to work for Dockinaorf Equipment; is that

20

correct?

21

A

Yes, sir.

22

Q

What's the full name of that company?

A

Dockindorf Equipment Company.

24

Q

During what period of time did you work for Dockindorf?

25

A

It was August of 1981 to June of '86.

23

Billy Gene Hankins.

2 549 Esplanade, Chico. California

I'm partially disabled from a previous occupation

i Q

What business was Dockindorf in?

2

A

He's a service station equipment and maintenance.

3

Q

What were your duties with Dock indorf during the time

4

you were employed there?

5

A

6

operation of gasoline service stations and overhead lube

7

equipment.

8

equipment that would be in a service station.

9

Q

Maintenance of equipments that have to do with the

What type of work did you do prior to joining Dockindorf

10

in 1981?

11

A

12
13

General maintenance of air compressors and other

I worked for part of the year under the name Norcai

I Equipment Company as self-employed doing service station
maintenance, removing of service stations, and fuel tanks,

14 J dispensers, general installation as well as demolition.
15

Previous to that, from 1977 to a time in 1981, I worked with

16 I Petroleum Equipment Company, who was at that time based in
17

Chico.

18

fueling systems, maintaining service stations and their

19

And I was doing the same basic work of installing

J equipment.

20

Q

All right.

21

A

And previous to that I had my own business of heating

22

and air conditioning under a state license of California,

23

which included a substantial amount of controls electrical.

24

Q

25

conditioning business?

Did you work with gas lines in your heating and air
Plumbing type work?

i A

Well, I have worked with plumbing type work since

2

approximately 1953, '54/in general construction of homes

3

and buildings, including all types of piping work in the

4

homes, as well as natural gas lines, and then the petroleum

5

lines when I went to work for Petroleum Equipment Company.

6

Q

7

to appear at this deposition here today; is that correct?

8

A

9 I0
10

A

n

Q

Now, I asked you to come up from your home in California

Yes.
And I paid your airline ticket?
Yes.
And so we wouldn't ail have to go down to California

12 I t o Your residence?
13
14

15

I A Yes.
Q

I correct?

is I A
17

I'm also in addition paying you an hourly rate; is that

| 0

18 I A

Yes.
And that's $30 an hour?
Yes.

19

Q

For your time?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

You understand that my agreement to pay you your time

22

has nothing to do with how you testify today?

23
24
25

A

No. I will not allow it to.

0

We only want you to tell the truth.

I'm going to ask

you a series of questions about this Gridley station

i

occurrence.

2

understand the question, 1*11 try to rephrase it.

3

A

Okay.

4

Q

You made the repairs to a gas line at the Gridley

5

station in approximately February of 1986, on or about

6

February 12, 1986; is that right?

7

A

& IQ

Yes.

If you'll just indicate to me if you don't

I did work on a service station in Gridley.

All right.

And that was the Gridley Gas And Save?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Tell me how you became involved in making those

n

repairs.

12

A

13

the lines in that station, because they indicated that they

14
15

I was given a work order from Mr. D o c k m d o r f to test

I thought they were losing fuel.

So I was given a work order

to test the petroleum lines in the station.

16 \ Q

So

Y ° u then went out to the station?

17

Were there any employees with you, or were you alone?

18 I A

Initially I had one other man with me.

19

0

Who was that?

20

A

There were two different men on the job.

21

the first man that was on the job was my son Leon, who was

I believe

22 | working temporarily for Dockindorf Equipment Company.
23

24

. Q

Can you tell me what you did after arriving at the

station?

25 I A

Well, the first thing we do is talk with the station

i maintenance personnel, who at that time was Cal Boley, and
2 to determine what they thought their problem was, and
3 indicated he thought he had an underground leak.
4

Then we proceeded to test the lines for indication of

5

leak.

6

the submersible pump and capping off the dispenser,

7

pressurizing the line in between.

8

maintain a pressure on the line.

9

Q

10 A
n

This would mean blocking off the fuel line both at

And we were unable to

Which line was that?
It was a line leading to a dispenser on the outside

island, and I believe it was the north dispenser on the

12 outside island.

I don't remember which product it was.

13 Q

What did you then do?

u

W e l l , our next procedure is to find if we have a leak.

A

15 We have some indication that there was a leak in the area
16 of the dispenser.
17

So we dug out an area alongside of the

island and we found no leak in that area, but indication

18 that fuel was running i n — a l o n g s i d e the lines from someplace
19
20

other than the area we were at.
And at that point we determined we would remove as much

2i

fuel from the lines as we could to get a free air capacity

22

in the lines, which is standard procedure, and that would

23

give us an ability to pressurize the lines.

24

Since the fuel will not be forced up through the

25

concrete or the pavement, but air will raise through those

1

areas, w e put a s u f f i c i e n t amount of air to a l l o w it to leak

2

out of w h e r e v e r the leak would b e , and then b y watering down

3

the area w e w i l l find the bubbles of w h e r e it comes up. And

4

in this p r o c e d u r e w e determined w e had a leak some distance

5

away from w h e r e w e h a d initially started at t h e dispenser.

6

Q

H o w far away from the dispenser w a s it?

7

A

A p p r o x i m a t e l y 40 foot in line of sight.

8

been c l o s e r to 50 foot as the lines w e r e r u n .

9

Q

What did y o u then do?

io

A

W e l l , it's a p r o c e s s then of digging down in that area

ii

to e x p o s e w h a t e v e r lines there are in that a r e a , as w e had

12

exposed an amount of line at that time, but then w e had to

13

dig down and expose the line to find where the leak was.

14

Q

Did you find where the leak was?

15

A

Yes, we did.

16 I 0
17

A

18 I 0
i9 J

It would have

H o w far u n d e r g r o u n d w a s it?
L e t ' s s e e . A p p r o x i m a t e l y 18 i n c h e s .
D i d y o u d e t e r m i n e what caused the leak?
MR. OLSON:

Objection.

No foundation.

20

A

21

I was sent out to repair a leak if it existed.

22 | Q

I wasn't sent out to determine what caused the leak.

(By M r . M i t c h e l l )

What I'm asking y o u i s , did y o u

23 | determine the source of the leak?
24 I A

W e d e t e r m i n e d t h e source of the leak, y e s .

25 I Q

W h a t w a s that?

i

A

W e had a b r o k e n f i t t i n g — o r , a b r o k e n p i p e a l o n g s i d e

2

of a f i t t i n g .

3

Q

Can y o u d e s c r i b e the b r e a k for m e ?

4

A

The b r e a k w a s in the pipe right next to t h e fitting,

5

w h i c h is the w e a k e s t part of any p i p e l i n e .

6

Q

W a s it a c l e a n b r e a k ?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

In y o u r o p i n i o n w a s that break c a u s e d b y — i n

9

o p i n i o n , what w a s that b r e a k caused b y ?

io

There was a clean break.

MR. O L S O N :

Objection.

No f o u n d a t i o n .

ii

A

I--

12

Q

(By M r . M i t c h e l l )

13

o p i n i o n w a s t h a t b r e a k c a u s e d by s o m e t h i n g

14

MR. O L S O N :

Let m e r e p h r a s e t h a t .

Objection.

your

In y o u r

sudden?

No foundation.

15

Q

(By M r . M i t c h e l l )

Go ahead.

16

A

A b r e a k of t h i s sort w o u l d have had to h a v e been caused

17

by an a d j u s t m e n t of the area in w h i c h it is in.

Something

18 I w o u l d h a v e had to h a v e m o v e d that a r e a .
19

0

20

M o v e m e n t of t h e e a r t h ?
MR. OLSON:

Objection.

O b j e c t to t h e

leading

2i

nature of the question.

22

Q

23

the earth when you say "adjustment of the earth"?

24
25

(By M r . M i t c h e l l )

MR. O L S O N :
Q

(By M r . M i t c h e l l )

Y o u ' r e t a l k i n g a b o u t m o v e m e n t of

Objection.

Leading.

Just for y o u r i n f o r m a t i o n ,

he's

i

entitled to make objections for the record, and they will

2

be ruled on at an appropriate time; but that has nothing

3

to do with you.

4

objection on the record, and then you can go ahead and

5

answer it,

6

A

7

a break of this sort, it would most logically be caused by

8

a movement of the ground such as would be caused by usually

Okay.

So when I ask a question, he's put his

I understand.

9 J heavy equipment.

In that case—when we would have

If heavy equipment has rolled across an

10

area, we could~we would have the possibility of a movement

11

enough of the ground to have caused this sort of a break.

12

Q

13

with?

14 I A
15

Any intentional damage to the pipe?
No work had been done in that area before we came.

there.

No previous work had been done in any short period

I of time.

t8 I Q

This leak was actually in the gas line; is that correct?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Would the gas leak constantly or only when the pump

21

i was activated?

22 |
23

Any

J disturbance of the ground was done at the time that we came

16
17

Was there any evidence that the pipe had been tampered

,A

MR. OLSON:

Objection.

No foundation.

A leak of this sort would occur only if there was

24 I pressure on the line.
25 I Q

(By Mr. Mitchell)

How would that pressure be caused?

A

Because a dispenser was turned off.

Q

In other words, you lift the lever of the dispenser,

and gas would flow through, and then it would leak through
the break?
A

Yes, because this is a submersible pump system.

Q

Then conversely, when you turned the pump off, what

would happen?
A

Well, the pressure relieves from the system down to

the point of whatever pressure is usually static on the line.
Q

So when the pump was off, the leak would stop?

A

It would stop if there—if there were a leak present,

it would stop only when there were no pressures on the line.
Q

I'm talking about this particular leak.

A

Yes.

Q

What did you do to repair the leak?

A

Remove the broken fittings, replace the line from that

They would go down to zero pressure on the line.

point to the dispenser, and at that point put in new fittings
and pipeline to the point that we could re-establish the
system and safely function without a leak.
Q

Are you aware of the fact that there was an earthquake

in the Gridley area sometime prior to this gas leak?
MR. OLSON:

Objection.

No foundation.

A

Yes, there was an earthquake in that area.

Q

(By Mr. Mitchell)

A

I didn't personally experience it, but it was highly

Did you experience that earthquake?

11.

1 publicized by the news producers.
2

MR. OLSON:

Motion to strike the answers to the

3 last two questions on the grounds that there was no
4

foundation.

5 Q
6

(By Mr. Mitchell)

9

Where did you read about the

earthquake?

7
8

This witness is without personal knowledge.

MR. OLSON:
A

Objection.

It was in the newspapers.

Hearsay.
It was on the news, for some

J period of time.

10

Q

(By Mr. Mitchell)

ii

A

In Chico, where I reside now.

12

Q

All right.

13

that had been caused by the earthquake?

Did the newspapers give accounts of damage

MR* OLSON:

14

Where did you reside at the time?

Objection.

Hearsay.

15

A

Yes.

They gave accounts that there was damage.

16

Q

(By Mr. Mitchell)

17

you saw at Gridley station be consistent with a break caused

18

by an earthquake?
MR. OLSON:

19

Would the break in the pipe which

Objection.

No foundation.

20

A

It could have caused it.

21

Q

(By Mr. Mitchell)

22

inconsistent with having been caused by an earthquake; is

23

that true?
MR. OLSON:

24
25

At least, it would not be

A

Same objection.

It would be feasible that it could have been done.

i Q

(By Mr. Mitchell)

Was there any evidence that the leak

2 had been caused simply by the pipe deteriorating and
3 eventually rotting through?
4 A

There was deterioration, but it was not a complete

5 deterioration through the line.
6 0

And the break that you've described was a clean break?

7 A

Yes.

e

Q

9 IA

Did you keep any of the parts that were on the old line?
As a rule we remove all materials from the station area

10

and return them to the yard.

n

happens to them thereafter we're not concerned with.

12

it laid around the yard very long, Mr. Dockendorf would have

13

salvaged it with whatever used pipe we had, which was a

14

common practice.

15

Q

16

purpose?

17

A

What
If

Did anyone request that you keep the parts for any

No.
MR. MITCHELL:

18

It's a safety factor.

I don't have anything else.

EXAMINATION BY MR. OLSON

19
20

Q

21

Transamerica Insurance Company, and we're the defendant in

22

this case.

23
24
25

Mr. Hankins, my name is Eric Olson.

I represent

I would like to ask you a few questions,

following up on some things that Mr. Mitchell has asked you.
First of all, when were you first made aware of the
fact that this lawsuit existed?

i A

I don't recall, but it's been at least a year.

2 0

Who told you about it?

3 A

I received a call from Cal Boley's superior, and I

4 don't—I'm trying to think of the man's name.
5

MR. MITCHELL:

6

THE WITNESS:

7I Q

e A
9

| Q

(By Mr. Olson)

Vern Dickman?
Yes.

Vern Dickman.

This was about a year ago?

It's been at least a year ago.
What did Mr. Dickman say to you in that telephone

10

call?

n

A

12

remembered any specifics about the job.

13

Q

At that time did you remember the job?

14

A

I remembered the job.

15

difficult job.

16

to—to correct the problem.

17

Q

He wanted to know if I remembered the job and if I

It was—it was a particularly

And so I remembered what we went through

What was it about the job that made it particularly

18 difficult?
19

A

20

on were buried underneath other lines.

21

much area to work with, and it becomes difficult to repair

22

an area without tearing up too large an area and yet keep

23
24
25

Part of the fact that the lines that we were working

the station in business.

You have not that

And the primary concern of the

customer is to keep their station in business.

And so it

becomes a problem to repair the extent of the damage and

put the station back—or, keep the station active while you
are working, because you always have the Hazard of traffic
in and out.

Those things are present in your mind when you

nearly get run over a time or two at a station.
Q

Other than the fact that these lines were below other

lines that were necessary to operate the station, was there
any other aspect of the job that made it unusual or
particularly difficult?
A

Part of it is the fact that the lines were in that

station.

Some of the original lines were buried in native

soil, which is a clay material, and it's—it doesn't dig
out easily.

It sticks to your shovel, sticks to your feet

and your shoes.
Q

It's difficult to work with.

Did that present some problems in this particular

instance in digging out to the lines?
A

It presented time.

Q

Now, you talk about the original lines. Were there

some lines you understood to have been placed at some point
in time earlier than other lines?
A

Yes, because there had been rebuilding work done in

the stations, other dispensers had been added.

There were

newer lines in the station.
Q

Were the lines at which this break had occurred, were

those among what you considered the original lines, or the
subsequent lines that were put in in the rebuilding process?
i

i A
2

I don't have any means by which to know at what time

the line was put in, other than there was probably 25 percent

3 corrosion on the lines, sufficient that we could not thread
4

the lines.

We needed to replace them.

s

0

6

you had to replace?

7

A

Pipelines, yes.

8

Q

Now, was the line you were working on where this break

g

occurred, were these among the oldest lines that you observed

When you say the lines, you're talking about the lines

10

on the property?

n

A

No.

12

Q

But these lines, iji any event, were buried underneath

13

some newer lines; is ,that correct?

There were older lines on the property.

14 A

Yes.

is Q

Now, in your conversation with Mr. Dickman, did he ask

16 you any other questions other than,

ft

Did you remember the

17 particular job?"
18

A

He wanted to know if I had remembered the work and

19

process that we went through to get to it.

20

him giving me any reason for his call, until later on in

21

our conversation.

22

and I w a s — I was trying to remember it, because, depending

23

on the work that has previously been done, at times if we

24

needed information we would go back and find people who had

25

done work on stations before and ask them what they had done.

I don't remember

H e — h e just wanted to know about the work,

1 It greatly simplifies the work you're doing in the future.
2 Q

And you remembered this particular job; is that correct?

3 A

Yes.

* 0

Did you describe to Mr. Dickman essentially what you've

5 told us today in answer to Mr. Mitchell's questions?
6

A

Yes.

7 Q

Had you ever spoken to Mr. Dickman before?

8 A

I knew of him because of his position in the maintenance

9
10

of the stations and because I had been sent to different
stations.

i Q

I was not personally acquainted with him.

I take it that about the time or around the time that

2 the work was done on this Gridley station you had dene other
3 work on other stations of Mr. Dickman's; is that correct?
4 A

Not that I was aware*of, because I was not really

5 acquainted with Mr. Dickman.
6

than we usually deal with.

He was in a higher position
The people we usually deal with

7 are in the position of Cal Boley or their—their the local
8 maintenance individual.
g

We seldom have contact with those

of higher level.
Q

So was this occasion about a year ago when you spoke

with Mr. Dickman the first time that you had actually
spoken with Mr. Dickman?
A

To my knowledge it is.

Q

Was it also the first time after the occasion on which

you made the repairs to the pipe that you spoke with anyone

1 about that repair?
2 A

It was only just briefly before that.

3 and asked me to call Mr. Dickman.

Cal called me

Left a number for me to

4

call him.

5

it to Mr. Dickman he wanted to talk to me at the station.

6

Q

You called Mr. Dickman rather than—

7

A

I called him back, because he had tried calling me,

8

and we had not made contact.

9 J Q

That would be the only fact in it.

He just said

And Cal Boley had called you just before that occasion

10

to asK you to call Mr. Dickman; is that correct?

n

A

Yes.

12

Q

And prior to Mr. Boley calling you to ask you to call

13

J Mr. Dickman, had you spoken with anyone else about this break

14 in the pipe there at that Gridley station?
15 A

I don't recall any knowledge of it, any concern on it.

16

Q

All right.

17

A

By the time I was no longer working for Mr. Dockindorf.

18 I Q

There was mention at the outset of your deposition of

19

a disability.

20

A

21

from running jackhammer on service station repair.

22 Q

What's the nature of that disability?

I have a sprained disk in the fourth and fifth lumbar

When did you suffer that injury?'?

23

A

I believe it was April 21 of '86.

24

Q

Did that result in your eventually leaving

25 Mr. Dockindorf's employ?

1 A
2

Yes.

In a month I was off of work, and I have not

returned to work for him since.

3 Q

Are you presently employed in any way?

*

A

Well, I—I--I do have a — I sell for Duratest Lighting

5

Corporation, which is not a full-time, but they would like

6

to have it be a full-time, but it's what time I can work.

7

Q

And that's a sales position?

e

A

Sales.

9 I Q

I take it from the background that you described in

10

i response to Mr. Mitchell's questioning that you spent

n

J approximately nine years give or take a few months in the

12

I business of servicing service station type equipment; is

13

that correct?

14 A

Yes.

15 Q

In the course of that employment did you have occasion

16 I to make the type of repair that we're talking about here
17 I in this particular litigation on a fairly regular basis?
is

A

Yes.

19

Q

Was there other than what you've already described about

20

the particular location of the pipes in relation to other

21

pipes and the type of soil, was there anything else about

22

this particular repair that is notable in your mind or

23

distinct from your normal experience with these types of

24

repairs?

25 A

Normally when we have a leaK,

it would be a corrosion

i that had ate through the pipe; but on this occasion we had
2 not only corrosion, but we had a clean break, and this is
3 not a normal circumstance.
4

The ground in the Gridley area across the river into

5

the west side into Willows and those areas is what we in

6

the layman's term call hot earth, because it is more

7 susceptible to grounding, and it causes more rusting in the
B

pipes, which is actually an electrolysis than usual.

9 J

We have replaced multiples of lines that have literally

10

rotted through, but these are usually always because the

n

rust has become so great that there is no longer any tensile

12

strength for the pipe to hold the fuel.

13

had a clean break, along with the corrosion.

14

Q

15

one—strike that.

16

you actually go to the property either to evaluate where

17

the leak was at or to make the repairs?

18

A

19

the property, determined we had a more extensive problem

20

than we could repair in that day.

21

takes authorization to do a greater amount of work.

22
23

In this case we

Now, you indicated that you were joined on at least
Let's go back.

How many occasions did

I don't remember the length of time, but we went to

We went back.

And from that point it

I'm not certain if it was the next day.

I believe it was another day or two later.

We went back,

24

prepared to tear up the area and do whatever work that was

25

needed to do to put that line back in service.

1 Q

How many days total were occupied, then, in doing this

2 repair?
3 A

I'm not talking about—

I really don't remember, but by the time we dug it out,

4

repaired the lines, and finished back both the concrete and

5

the blacktop, it could have been ask much as three days.

6

Q

So this would be three days total; is that correct?

7 A

Yes, it's a little far back for me to remember, and

a

I didn't have any other information that recorded thar.

9 I Q

Well, was your time billed out on an hourly basis to

10

the customer?

11

A

12

out, but in a case like this it would usually be time and

13

I don't—I don't know how Mr. Dockindorf billed that

I material.

14 J Q
15

A

Time and material?
Yes.

16 I Q
17

Did you have any involvement then in the billing of

this?

18 I A

No.

All I did was write out a material and labor record

19

describe what I did, describe the materials that I used,

20

and write down the time of myself and men that were on the

21

job.

22

would make his bill to the company.

23

Q

24

this time, is that correct, if anybody has them?

25

A

Off of that material and labor record Mr. Dockindorf

And Mr. Dockendorf would have all those documents at

Mr. Dockendorf had a habit of throwing away those

1 documents once he had made a bill.
2 doing business.

That's just his way of

Whatever is on the written bill that was

3 given to the company would be most possibly the only record
4

that would be available presently.

5 Q

You mean whatever Mr. Dickman's company received would

6 be the only available record in your experience?
7 A
8

Mr. Dockindorf had a habit of throwing away the labor

and material records.

9 I Q

It's your belief that in this instance that's probably

10

what he did?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

In the course of your visits to the property to make

13

the repair, were you the only person that made that visit?

u

It would be the greatest possibility.

I I think you indicated that at least on one occasion you were

15

accompanied by your son?

16

A

17

a Sam Sumner I believe was on that job, too.

16

one of the maintenance men from Mr. Dockindorf.

19

Q

Do you know if Mr. Sumner still works for Mr. Dockindorf^

20

A

He does.

21

0

Where does he reside?

22

A

No.

Q

Is your son still with Dockindorf?

24

A

No.

25

Griffin, that's doing the same kind of work.

23

I believe my son Leon was with me on the job, and also

Does he live in Chico there?

He lives in the McGalia area.

No.

He's another

Paradise Pines.

He's working with Griffin Equipment.

Barry

i Q

In any event, he still lives in the area, is that

2 correct?
3 A

Yes.

4 Q

Where does he live?

5 A

He lives I think it's 1647, I believe it is, East

6 Avenue.
7 Q

East Avenue?

g

(Witness nods head.)

9 IQ

In Chico?

10

A

Yes.

n

Q

Now, did both your son Leon and Mr. Sumner observe this

12

break that you have described for us?

13

A

Leon may have.

14

Q

Why is it you draw that distinction in your mind?

15

A

Sam came on the job a little later to help us finish

16

up on the main construction after we found the—anything

17

that Sam would have seen would have probably been out of

18

the ground and a removed piece of pipe.

19

recollection, that would have been what he saw.

20

Q

21

son at all to see what his recollection is?

22

A

23

wanted was payday and Friday was all he was interested in.

24

Q

25

Mr. Dickman called, do you know when was the next time you

I don't believe that Sam did.

If he had any

Have you discussed this particular repair with your

No.

He had his head in the air at that time.

Letfs go back to something before I forget.

All he

After

i

heard from anybody about this case?

2

A

3

to know if I had been contacted by anybody in reference to

4

it.

5

Q

Was this recently, or was t h i s —

6

A

It was after—no.

7

oh, six or eight months ago.

8

contact with me may have been longer than that.

9

10

We had another conversation.

He called me again, wanted

It was—no, that would have been,
The time element—his first
I really

J don't remember.
Q

Do you recall in that first contact he mentioned

ultimately there was litigation about this question?
12

A

There was a comment that there was a question as to

13

what the losses were and who was going to pay for them.

14

Q

15

he just s a y —

16

A

I don't remember whether he did or not.

17

0

Do you recall anything else that Mr. Dickman said to

Did he say there was actually a lawsuit filed, or did

18 | you in that first conversation other than what you've already
19

indicated to us?

20

A

21

No.

I—I

don't.

I think I'm probably getting mixed

I up in my mind conversations with him and conversations with

22 I Mr. Mitchell.
23

Q

You did at some point in time speak with Mr. Mitchell

24

as well; is that correct?

25

(Witness nods head.)

1

0

Did you speak with anyone else other than Mr. Mitchell

2

from Mr. Mitchell's office?

3

A

4

talked to.

5

Q

6

this?

7

A

I believe it was twice.

8

Q

What was the first time that you spoke to Mr. Mitchell?

No.

Not that I remember.

He is the only one I've

Hew many times have you spoken with Mr. Mitchell about

9 J A

W e l l , I don't remember the time element on that, sir;

10

but it was at the very least early spring of this year.

u

Q

12

Mr. Dickman; is that correct?

13

A

It was after the last time you had spoken with

Yes.

14 I Q

Do you recall what you and Mr. Mitchell talked about

15

during the course of that conversation?

16

A

17

questions he asked m e , wanted to know about it.

is I Q

Basically the conversation we have had here is

Did he give you any information in the course of that

19

conversation other than just ask you questions?

20

A

21

that there w a s litigation involved.

No, I don't recall any information on that, other than
He did tell me that

22 | there was litigation involved.
23
24

I Q

Then M r . Mitchell spoke with you a second time after

that?

25 I A

I reference to arrangements for this meeting.

i

Q

At that time did you get into a conversation about the

2

facts of the break, or was it just simply setting up the

3

time for the deposition that we're here at today?

4

A

5

conversation that there was a necessity for a deposition.

6

Q

No, we usually referred back to the previous

Did Mr. Mitchell have an opportunity to meet with you

7 J today prior to this deposition, as well?
8

iA

Yes.

9 IQ

Did you at that time again discuss the questions that

10

he had about the break at the Gridley station?

n

A

We basically discussed the same thing we discussed here-

12

I He wanted to know why I felt that way, what my background

13

was, my work background, the period of time I had worked,

t4 I the length of my background, what I was doing presently.
15
16
17

Q

So you basically went over essentially what's been

I covered already in this deposition; is that correct?
A

Everything we covered has pretty well been brought out

18 I here.
19

Q

20

or send you any documents?

21

A

22 | Q
23
24

A

Did Mr. Mitchell at any time show you any documents

I don't believe so, other than a plane ticket.
I

see

*

He just sent me that.

i me to come.

25 I 0

Do

y°u

A letter saying that he wanted

I don't remember anything else.
know

i f Mr

* Mitchell has spoken with your son

Leon?
2I A
3 Q

I don't believe he has.
Now, going back to the actual circumstances that

4

occurred back—I believe the testimony was February of 1986

6

— d o you recall specifically in your mind that it was

6

February of 1986 that this occurred?

; J A
8

I don't—I don't recall the definite date of the work

at all.

9

| Q

Do you even recall the year that it occurred?

10

A

11

of time, I was not keeping a log book, which I have at times,

12

but I was not keeping a log book at that time.

13

be difficult for me to put a date on that as to when we

14

worked.

15

have had to have come out of Mr. Dockindorffs records. I

16

really don't have a definite date on it.

17

Q

18

Mr. Dockindorf would have that would reflect the time of

19

the work?

20

A

Just the date on his bill.

21

Q

Does he maintain that bill as a part of his records

22

in your experience?

I wouldn't commit myself to that, sir.

At the period

So it would

Any information as far as the time of the work would

Are there any records that you're aware of today that

A

Oh, yes.

24

0

So to the extent that in the course of your testimony

25

elicited by Mr. Mitchell, there was a mention of a date,

23

He keeps records on those.

i you were simply adopting whatever counsel's suggestion was
2

as to the date of that repair; is that correct?

3

A

4

comment was made as far as the date was concerned, it had

5

to come out of somebody else's records than mine, because

6

I didn't—in fact, when—and I don't remember the date that

7

he asked, but I did go back over my log books to see if I

e

had recorded anything.

9

time, at that time I had not kept a log book.

10
n

Q

Yes.

I never researched anything on that.

If any

And from that six months period of

You say six months period of time.

And that pericd

I of time we were referring to?

12

A

13

records in my books. y There were times when I faithfully

14

kept a log book.

15

Q

16

repair?

17

A

No.

18

0

Now, when I speak of this repair, so we understand each

19

other, I'm referring to the repair of the Gridley station

20

23

I didn't have any

There were times when I flaked out.

Did you know Cal Boley before you did this particular

I had heard the name, but I didn't know him.

that we've been talking about here.
(Witness nods head.)

21
22

Basically in that range of time.

Q

I don't want to say that whole sentence every time.

All right?

Had you done work at Mr. Boley's request on any

24

prior occasion before you did this particular repair?

25

A

I wouldn't know that, sir, because—unless Mr. Boley

1

had been on a job, which he was not on any job.

I don't

2

know what stations he has control over.

3

have given me a work order to do work on a certain station.

4

Whether it belonged to that company or not I would not have

5

knowledge of.

6

Q

7

you don't know whether prior to this repair you've done any

8

repairs for any other stations owned by Mr. Dickman or run

9

by Mr. Boley; is that correct?

Mr. Dockindorf would

So to the best of your knowledge as you sit here today,

io

A

I wouldn't have any knowledge as to who had control

u

of the stations.

12

Q

Is Mr. Boley still operating that station?

13

A

Mr. Boley is still in the area.

The only reason I know

u I that is because I bought some musical equipment from him,
15

and other than that I don't know whether he's tied up with

16

the station or not.

17

I just bought some of his equipment.

18

Q

19

to that station and look at the problem you've testified

20

about?

21

A

Craig Dockindorf.

22

Q

Is he the Dock ndorf from Dockindorf Equipment?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Now, what did he tell you you were supposed to go do?

25

What was his comment to you about what you were supposed

He had been a professional musician.

Now, who actually gave you the assignment to go out

to go do?
2

I A

Craig just says:

"Just go find out what the problem

3

is.

4

If you've got a problem, you call him.

5

to do.

6

Q

7

or did they also do installations, sell gas, service station

8

equipment, as well?

9

10

J A

Let me know what it is."

He has a radio in his truck.
He tells you what

Was Dockindorf Equipment limited to simply doing repairs

He sells all forms of equipment that had to do with

the petroleum industry.
aviation, whatever.

All forms, whether it's a fuel truckt

He has equipment and repair parts for

12

, all of them.

A substantial amount of his work was new

13

I dispensers, or used dispensers and pumps, and the control

14

j systems that went with them.

He got as little underground

15

work as he could get away with.

16

Q

17

of installing—

18

A

Installation.

19

Q

— a s well as doing the type of maintenance work that

20

we're talking about here today; is that correct?

21

A

Yes.

22

0

So after he had directed you to go to the Gridley

23

station, you went to the station?
(Witness nods head.)

24
25

But your responsibilities would be both in the form

Q

What did you do?

You've indicated generally what you

1

did.

But if you could specifically tell me the first thing

2

you did in order to pinpoint wherever this particular leak

3

was.

4

A

5

Mr. Boley as to what he felt his problem was, because he

6

is the local maintenance man of that area.

7

then we would proceed to close down the system that we were

8

working on, which entailed nonoperation signs on the

9

dispenser and things of that sort, which would keep anyone

Well, the first step was to have a conversation with

From that point,

10

from turning on the system.

Shut down that system, so that

11

we would have a clean opportunity to pressure-test the lines.

12

0

13

location?

14

A

There are two islands.

15

Q

Two islands.

16

A

I believe there's two pumps on each.

17

of that.

18

dispensers.

19

Q

So a total of four dispensers in the entire system?

20

A

I don't remember there being any more than that.

21

Q

22

of some sort where they operate or they receive the money

23

and so forth?

24

A

How many service islands were there at this particular

How many pumps on each one?

Two dispensers, I should say.

I'm not certain
Not pumps.

They're

'Now, aside from the dispensers, is there like a building

There is a mobile home, which is established and could

25 be used as a living quarters there on the premises, which

1

has an office in it where you pay for the gas.

2

Q

3

anything at the location other than—to your observation

4

was there any business conducted there other than just

5

selling gasoline?

6

A

7

sort would be in the area.

e Q

At the time you visited the location, did they do

Not other than the usual coke machine or things of that

There wasn't a little market cr anything like that?

9

A

No.

10

Q

There was no garage o r —

ii

A

Cigarettes or coke, or something of that sort they had,

12

but no—not beyond that.

13

~Q

There was no maintenance bay there, I take it?

14

A

No, no.

15

Q

How large are the premises to the best of your

16

observation?

17

A

18

100 feet deep is about the area.

19

0

20

for the service station operation?

21

A

22

of that area belongs to the service station area I have no

23

idea.

24

0

25

used in its entirety for the service* station operation in

Oh, close to 150, 175 foot of road frontage and 90 to

Is the entire property being used in one form or another

The station backs up into an orchard area, and how much

But the 170 feet by 90 feet you've described is being

1

one form or another?

2

A

3

side toward the north side, where the north side has a little

4

less use of the area than the south side.

5

Q

6

that correct?

7

A

Yes-

8

Q

Are the two fuel islands also oriented in a north-south

9

direction?

It divides off into somewhat of an angle from the south

So the road just runs in a north-south direction; is

It is Highway 99E.

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Does this mobile home office you've described, is that

12

on the rear side of the property?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

It sort of runs parallel with the fuel islands as well;

15

is that correct?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Now, of the two fuel islands, which one is the island

18

that has the dispenser that was experiencing the pressure

19

difficulties?

20

A

21

initial work began on the outside island, because that's

22

where the evidence was.

23

both islands, because it is a submersible pump system.

24

Q

25

know?

Well, both islands had the dispenser on it, but our

But the line divided and went to

Was this line carrying leaded or unleaded fuel, do you

i A

I donf t remember,

2 Q

Now, you've basically described a rectangular piece

3 of property.
4 A
5

Yes.

Is that correct?

Pretty close to it.

I think it's a little bit

further north and south than it is east and west.

6 Q

Now, is it correct, my understanding, that the fuel

7 J islands are essentially in the middle of the property?
e

|A

9 \Q

Essentially, yes.
From the two fuel islands, how does one proceed to get

10

to the tank where the fuel was stored that was leaking?

n

A

12

nearly on the inside, on the south side of the inside island,

13

but close to the property line on the south side.

14

Q

Was there more than one tank?

15

A

Yes, there is.

16

or three.

17

Q

The tanks lay on the south side of the lot, centered

But I don't remember how many.

Two

I don't remember.

So when you arrived at the property and you spoke to

10

(Mr. Boley, what specifically did he tell you about the

19

| problem that he was experiencing?

20

A

He was experiencing a loss of fuel.

Their totalizers

21

on the dispensers and their fuel going into the tank was

22

not corresponding.

23

Q

Discrepancy there?

24

A

There was a discrepancy between the product being sold

25

and the product coming in.

1

Q

Did he tell you precisely what sort cf discrepancy they

2

were experiencing?

3

A

If he did, I don't recall.

4

Q

Do you recall in general his indicating that was a large

5

discrepancy or a small discrepancy?

6

A

It was a sizable discrepancy, yes.

7

Q

Did he indicate for what period of time they had been

8

experiencing that discrepancy?

9

A

He made a comment that he thought it had—it had been

10

some--there had been some time.

I don't remember any time

11

element being given as to that.

12

Q

Just the general comment that it had been some time?

13

A

A comment that they were—it had—there had been enough

14

discrepancy that they had taken definite consideration that

15

there was a time element in which they would check to see

16

if they lost any, which is standard procedure in service

17

stations.

18

with the totalizers against the fuel to make certain that

19

your bookwork is proper, and then the bookwork is the first

20

thing we look at.

21

Q

I see.

22

A

Yes.

23

totalizers match with your product?

24

being sold?

25

bringing in?

A leak you will check a certain period of time

You as the maintenance person?

The first thing we request is:

"How does your

Is all of your product

Are you selling less product than what you're
How does your totalizer match with the product

you're bringing in?11

1

2 Q

Did he actually show you the bookwork, or simply

3 characterize it for you?
4

A

5

bookwork.

6

Q

Did he indicate he had such bookwork to check?

7

A

Oh, yes.

8

Q

But you never actually consulted that yourself or

9

No.

We just admonished him to go back and check his

J discussed it with him other than to tell him to check it?

10

A

No.

11

Q

After you had checked it—or, after you had discussed

12

that with him—and you had them, I guess, shut down the fuel

13

system; is that correct?

14

|

(Witness nods head.)
MR. MITCHELL:

15

You have to answer.

16

0

(By Mr. Olson)

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

Describe to me again what it was you did once the system

19

was shut down in order to make the first step towards

20

identifying the nature, if any, of the problem.

21

A

22

to shut off the safety valves on the dispenser and close

23
24
25

You have to say yes or no.

We shut down the system.

Well, this type of system, our first thing would be

off the check valve at the pump and pressurize the tank—or,
the lines from the dispenser to the tank.
we did not have a stable pressure.

And in doing so

1

Q

You have drawn a distinction between the dispenser and

2

the pump.

3

the nozzle out of and stick in my car.

4

A

5

a dispenser has no pumping unit within it.

6

draw fuel from a tank.

7

pressurized from the bank.

8

Q

So in this type of system where is the pump located?

9

A

Submerged m

10

Q

In the tank.

11

dispenser?

12

A

Close to 75 feet, at least, on this system.

13

Q

When you took t£e readings of this uneven pressure,

14

that's an indication there is some sort of a fault in the

15

system; is that correct?

16

A

17

to find out why.

18

Q

19

a determination of the reason why thai, would not hold

20

pressure?

21

A

22

the safety valve under the dispenser, and that is on the

23

pipe side of the valve, closing the valve.

24

valve at the submersible pump, you have the possibility of

25

gaining pressure, positive pressure on the line that should

I take it the dispenser is the thing that I pull
Is that correct?

The distinction between a dispenser and a pump is that
A pump would

A dispensei would receive it

the tank.
So it's some 40 or 50 leet away from the

If the line will not hold the pressure, then you have

Where do you first look then in order to try to make

Well, this type of system, there is an access plug on

And closing the

i be able to maintain easily 50 pounds.
2 0

So you basically close off at the plug and close off

3 at the pump, and then you induce some pressure into the line?
4

A

5

a close off valve with the pressure at the gauge, and the

6

pressure gauge should maintain the pressure that you put

7

into it.

e

0

9

Induce air into the line.

Pressurize it.

In this case that's what you did?

You have

You closed off those

J two valves?

10

A

Yes.

n

Q

Put the pressure in, and I take it the line would not

12

maintain the pressure?

13

A

The line would not maintain pressure, no.

14

Q

So what then did you do next to identify why the line

15

was not maintaining pressure?

16

A

17

indication was that there was fuel under the dispenser.

At that point we looked for fuel losses, and the
So

is | we dug out on the side of the dispenser in the isiand drive
19

slab area to find the lines and be able to dig into those

20

lines to determine if we had a leak at that point.

21

Q

And what you found is there was no leak at that point?

22

A

We found no leaks at that point.

23
24
25

And when you find

no leak at that point, you progress further back the line.
As we progressed further back of the line, we began to find
evidence of fuel flowing from further down the line into

1

that area,

2

Q

3

or was it a higher concentration—

4

A

5

we were working in.

6

Q

Was it large amounts of fuel?

7

A

Yes.

6

Q

So are we talking about as you trenched, you would

9

actually have gasoline pooling in some form in your trencn;

What was the evidence?

Was it just the fuel itself,

Fuel flowing out of the pipeline area into the ditch

10

is that right?

11

A

Yes.

12

0

How deep was the trench that you were digging?

13

A

Probably 12 inches at the island area.

14

Q

That's about how deep the pipe was buried; is that

15

correct?

16

A

17

can't cover it with concreter we like it to be deeper.

18

Q

19

a concrete paving, or was it an oil paving, or what?

20

A

21

dispensers and the islands.

22

over to the tanks, which are, once again, covered with

23

concrete.

24

Q

25

the area covered by concrete is an acceptable depth?

Yes, usually at that area where you cover it.

If we

Now, in this particular service station was the paving

There was concrete on the drive areas between the
There is asphalt from that area

You indicated that a 12-inch depth for the pipes in

iI A

By code you can go down to six inches.

2I Q

How about on those areas where it's covered by asphalt,

3

is there a greater depth of burying the pipe?

4

A

5

that we do go down with it.

5

we concrete over it before we put asphalt in it.

7

Q

8

the size of pipe you're talking about?

9

10

J A
Q

Not on this size of pipe, but it is a general practice
If we cannot get it lower, then

Now, you say "this size of pipe."

Will you give me

Inch and a half galvanized.
And it's a galvanized pipe from the point ot the

11

dispenser all the way back to the pump; is that correct?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Is it galvanized steel?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

Did you make any determination as you worked with this

16

pipe as to how long it had been in the ground?

17

A

18

the condition of other pipes around it; and not having any

19

history of the station, it's difficult to make a

20

determination.

21

Q

Is that important to know in making the repairs?

22

A

Only as it has to do with whatever corrosion may be

23
24
25

That's difficult to do with the type of group and with

on the pipelines.
0

Did you ask Mr. Boley, for instance, how long the pipe

I had been in the ground?

1

A

If I did, I don't recall the conversation.

2

Q

You indicated earlier there were some pipes that ran

3

over the top of the pipe that was being repaired; is that

4

correct?

5

A

6

station after this line was in there, and they were newer

7

pipes.

8

Q

Were these also galvanized one and a half inch pipe?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Was it observable as you look at the two sets of pipe,

11

the difference in age between the two?

12

A

13

in the ditch.

14

I don't remember that the new piping was alongside of the

15

old piping, although there were—the piping was very close

16

to each other, which contributed to the difficulty of working

17

with it.

18

Q

19

look older than the new pipe?

20

A

21

pipe.

22

Q

23

the two?

24

A

25

of corrosion on it.

Yes, sir.

There had been other work done in the

They were newer lines and above this line.

There was difference in age of the two as they were
As we come to the place where the break was,

Just to look at the two sets of pipe, did the old pipe

The pipe where the break was was definitely an older

What was it about that looked older, as you observed

As I said before, approximately, maybe 25, 30 percent
And by that I mean the thickness of

\

the pipe, the life of the pipe material.

2 0

When you used the term corrosion, just for my

3 visualizing in my mind, are we talking about a decomposition
4

of the material in the pipe?

b

A

You call it rust.

6

Q

Rust?

7

I A Yes.

8

Q

Is that what it is?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Now, you indicated you did some form of testing to

11

determine exactly the location of the break; is that correct?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Apart from putting the pressure into the pipe, what

14

| else did you do in order to find the precise location of

15

the break?

16

A

17

of the line as you can get out.

18

the line as you can.

19

you the ability to find the leak.

20

volume of air into the system, then that volume of air will—

21

it will go out where the leak is.

22
23

24

25

Well, the first step you do is take as much fuel out
You want as much air in

It's the volume of air that will give
And as we interject a

At that point, by using water and hosing down the area,
the air will come up through the asphalt where the fuel
would not tend to come up through the asphalt.

It would

tend to follow wherever the pipe ditches fill.

It comes

i up wherever it relieves with air.
2 up.

But the air will come

And so you would find the bubbles.

And wherever those

3 bubbles are, that's where you would excavate.
4

Q

So you were just wetting down the asphalt and pulling

5 air through the pipe and watching where the bubbles came
6 out of the asphalt?
7 A
8

Yes, because we have no idea m

a system like this where

the pipelines run.

9I Q

Did that take you several hours to get to the point

10

where when you first talked to Mr. Boley ana arrivea at the

n

scene until the time you found out where it was?

12 A

Oh, yes.

Yes.

We were later on in the day before we

13

finally found the power leak was not where we thought it

14

was.

15

Q

16

gasoline near the dispenser; is that correct?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

Now, on that first day that you were there, did you

19

actually excavate and locate the portion of pipe that these

20

bubbles were coming out of?

21

A

22

or not.

23

Q

At least—

24

A

It would have been feasible to have gotten that far,

25

but I don't remember that we did.

And you thought it was there where you found the first

I don't remember that we got that far the first day

^\Q

At a minimum you do recall that you had seen the bubbles

2 I at that point and had an idea of where it would be; is that
3 correct?
4

A

Yes,

5

Q

All right.

6

But at some point in time you did excavate

J it down to the pipe itself; is that correct?

7

A

Yes.

8

I Q

9

J this with a machine, or did you do it by hand?

Describe for me how you went about excavating it.

Was

10

A

We dug it by hand.

11

Q

This is you and your son?

12

A

Yes.

13

it aside, because that, we haul off.

And it's a case of

14

shoveling down to the area where you

can get to the pipe.

15

Q

16

area?

17

A

It was two and a half, thre£ inch.

18

Q

You testified that the pipe was about 18 inches deep;

19

is that correct?

20

A

Approximately.

21

Q

That's 18 inches from the top of the asphalt to where

22

the pipe was located?

23
24
25

We take off the asphalt off the top, usually lay

How thick was the asphalt that was over that particular

A

Close.

Yes.

Q

So you dug about a foot and a quarter of actual dirt

material before you reached the pipe itself; is that correct?

i A

As I remember the job, yes.

2 0

Now, was it in the course of this digging that the

3 difficulty arose with the other pipes being around the pipe
4

you were attempting to fix?

5 A

Well, you have to dig around all of the pipes, and you

6

have to clean the pipes off to be able to find where the

?

leak is.

e

may be on the bottom side of the line.

9 J it is.

And even then the leak may not be visible.

It

Most of the times

And then you would have to clean around the lines,

10

clean off the lines enough to be able to find where your

ii

leak is at.

12

Q

13

actually dig under the pipe, so that you can get some

14

perspective on the pipe?

15

A

16

on the pipes as we can.

17

location, we go back to our testing procedure, so that we

18

find closer to where we're at.

19

area, you know where you have to work, what you have to work

20

with and where you have to work.

21

Q

Do you recall doing that on this occasion?

22

A

Yes.

Q

After you dug down and exposed the pipes, then you went

23

I guess it would be necessary, would it not, to

Usually we will dig down to the pipes and clear as much
And once we're down to that

And once you've found the

24

back to testing and blowing air through the system again?

25

A

This pinpoints the very point.

We would do that, or

i we would have pressure on the line when we're digging down
2 close to that area, so that we don't dig in the wrong
3 direction.
4

You dig toward where the area is coming out,

and then once you get down to the point that you've founa

5 your problem, you prospect that very area to see what you
6

have, because it's just common practice.

You don't dig any

7 more than you nave to.
8
9

Q

Sure.

So you would actually keep water running so that

J you would have the bubbles coming up as an indicator of where

10

you're supposed to be headed?

11

A

12

remove the water, because it's difficult to work in.

13

No.

Once you have found the basic area, you would

then you would work in that.

And

Other than that, what we have

14

found was fuel.

15

Q

So you were working through the fuel towards the hole?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

In this instance was it necessary to dig under the pipe

18

at ail in order to get out the particular break?

19

A

20

to the break.

21

Q

22

the point at which the pipe had broken?

23
24
25

Oh, yes.

You're working in a level of fuel.

We had to dig around them to be able to get

Did there come a time when you could actually then see

A

Yes.

Q

Was that on the first day that you were digging, or

was that on the next occasion that you visited the site?

^I A

It viould have been logical that v*e got that, far on the

2 first day, but considering the extent of what we did to find
3 this' leak, it might have been the second day.
4

Q

What did you see then when you finally saw the leak?

5 J Describe for me what you observed.
6

A

Well, we observed the fact that we had a leak in the

7

pipe next to a fitting.

8

remove the pipe and the fitting to be able to do any sort

9

of repair at that point.

It become evident that we had to

And this means we ciear out as

10

much around the line as is possible, so that we can get into

11

the area and cut off the pipe, prepare to either put a

12

section in it, replace the fittings, or repair the—replace

13

it complete.

14

0

15

a connecting—piece of pipe that connects two other pieces

16

of pipe?

17

A

18

of pipe or an elbow that rhe pipe comes in and makes a turn

19

upon.

20

Q

Was this a coupling, or was this an elbow?

21

A

I don't remember.

22

0

But do you recall that the break you observed was in

23

the proximity of the fitting?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Are we talking about within a matter of inches or

You use the word fitting.

A fitting is essentially

You have either a coupling that connects the two pieces

Either one of them would be termed a fitting.

is that correct?

1 fractions of an inch?
2 A

Fractions of an inch.

3 Q

Fractions of an inch?

4

(Witness nods head.)

5

Q

Was it on the underside of the pipe, or was it on the

6

top side of the pipe, or had the pipe actually made a clean

7

break?

8

A

9

I 0

The pipe was broke.
When you talk about a clean break, you refer to a clean

10

break as what?

11

A

12

thing keeping anything into it was the surrounding area of

13

the—what was packed around it.

14

Q

So the pipe was no longer touching?

15

A

They would have been touching, but it would have been

16

basically sheared off.

17

Q

18 | A

The pipe had broken to the extent that it was—the only

Was it sheared at all points around the pipe, however?
Yes.

That it was completely sheared, I do not remember;

19

but it was substantially broken.

20

portion of it holding on, but the majority of it was a shear

21

break.

22

Q

23
24
25

There may have been a small

Do I understand correctly that this shear did not

actually include the coupling, but was so close to the
coupling that it necessitated removal of the coupling as
I well?

1

A

Yes, because the threads of the remainder of that pipe

2

would be in that coupling; and it's almost impossible to

3

remove those out of it and use that fitting again.

4

not choose to do that.

5

replace that fitting.

6

Q

7

just like a straight line, or was it cracked in its uneven

8

fashion, like teeth or something?

9

A

We would

We would choose to remove that and

Was this break a smooth break?

Was it on an even plane,

Well, breaks in that case don't break as though you

10

had cut them.

They would be somewhat uneven.

11

Q

12

repair had you seen this type of break?

13

A

14

very often.

15

the pipe was literally ate up.

16

Q

17

observed one differ from the type of break you're describing

18

here?

19

A

20

procedures of electrolysis, where this procedure of

21

electrolysis the metal materials are basically eaten up by

22

the electrical discharge at that point to where you'd have

23

basically only the carbon of the metal left, which becomes

24

a crusted material, which has no tensile strength.

25

that point it gets to the point that the pressure will

On previous occasions where you had done this type of

Yes, we've seen this type of break before.

It's not

It was mostly they would be corrosion where

How does a corrosion break in your experience as you

Well, to explain that you would have to understand the

And at

i actually push that away from the material, and the fuel will
2 leak out of it.
3 0

In the case of a corrosive break, are they generally

4

complete breaks throughout the pipe, or can it b e —

5

A

6

of those will look like a little crater that's just down

7

from a large area on the outside of the pipe down to maybe

e

a pinhole the size of a pencil lead at the inside, and other

g

J than that you will find serpentine areas along the pipe for

10

a distance where it is corroding where you will have little

n

crack lines running parallel with the line.

12

corroded areas will force out or chip out.

13

Q

14

encountered it and identified where it was at?

15

A

He was present at the station.

16

Q

Did you point it out to him and say, "Here's your

17

problem"?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

So he would have knowledge also in terms of observation

20

of what the nature of the break was; is that correct?

21

A

He should have.

22

Q

Anybody else that would have observed the break other

23
24
25

No.

No.

They're generally just small areas, and many

And those

Did Mr. Boley observe this break when you had

than Mr. Boley and your son and perhaps Mr. Sumner at least
in seeing the pipe after it was taken out of the ground?
A

Well, a piece of material like this becomes what we

1

I would c a l l show and tell.

And we talk about the

2 I circumstances of "This is what wc found on the job, and this
3

4

J is the extent to which the corrosion w a s , " or the break,
or that sort.

And usually in shop talk, if you had bad

* | corrosion and you had a loss of, "Well, this is the area
6

I that was lost and we founa it in this kind of condition,"

7

whether it was dirt that had been left in the line when there

8

should have been sand around the lines, or whether it was

9

buried in a native soil,

it does make a difference.

If

TO

any dirt is against a line, even though you're m

a sanded

n

area, it w i l l ground at that point of dirt, and you will

12

get a leak.

13 Q

What do you mean when .you say "Grounded at that point"?

14 A

W e l l , all fuel traveling in a pipe generates electricity

15 and that electricity has to discharge somewhere, and it will
16 discharge w h e r e there is a clear grounding source.
w

is not a clean grounding source.

Sand

But wherever it would touch

i8 an earth, then there would be enough there for it to start
19

going through the pipeline and into that grounding source.

20

When that takes place, electrolysis sets in.

21

the line b e g i n s .

22

have a hole in that line.

23

Q

24

at the point w h e r e you dug up this particular break?

25

A

Corrosion of

And at some time in the future you will

N o w , w a s that particular set of circumstances present

T h e r e was some level of corrosion on the pipeline.

1 !
2
3

4
5

Q

Was there any indication from what you observed of the

break that that level of corrosion had any impact on the
I fact of the break had occurred?
A

It would weaken the line.

It would make it susceptible

] to damage.

6

Q

7

type of break in your work, in any of those circumstances

Now, on the previous occasions where you had seen this

8

I had you been in possession of facts to indicate exactly what

9

J had caused those breaks to occur, like a car ran over it

10

or somebody dropped a heavy object in the vicinity or an

11

earthquake or whatever?

12 I A

Occasionally we would have information of that type.

1

But sometimes we didn't.

14

available.

15

a problem in the area.

16

it was there.

3

17

IQ

And to what reason wouldn't be

Occasionally we would know that there had been
Occasionally we wouldn't know why

In those situations where you knew what had caused the

particular break that was similar to the one we're talking
19 I about in this case, what type of circumstances historically
20

had you had knowledge of that would cause those kinds of

21

breaks?

22

A

23

was a rather open area, and we had a lot of corrosion

24

problems in that station.

25

fittings that were corroded through.

Well, we had a Shell sort of station in Willows that

And occasionally we would find
We had a lot of

i

fittings corroded through there,

I don't remember whether

2

we had any breaks in there, but we did have heavy equipment

3

roll over that area, and those lines w e r e not buried as

*

deeply as they should have been-

5

few breaks in those areas; but if the line was broken, the

6

ground had to be substantially moved to cause that.

7

Q

e

observed the maintenance of this particular pipe now at the

Consequently, we had a

Was there anything about the manner in which you

9 J Gridley station that would indicate to you that it had not
10

been properly maintained?

11

A

12

No.

Maintenance is not a question.

Once it's

I underground, maintenance is not a question.

13

Q

Had it been buried sufficiently deep?

u

A

This line was buried fully sufficiently, y e s .

The lines

is J above it I questioned, but they w e r e not broken.
16

0

Are these lines all running parallel to each other?

i? I A

Yes.

18

Immediately above this particular clean break that

0

19 I you've described on the older line, there w e r e newer lines
20

that remained intact; is that correct?

21

A

22 I 0

Yes.
Did you undertake at the time of the repairs that you

23

were m a k i n g on this line to determine what had caused the

24

break?

25

happen?"

Did you ask anybody q u e s t i o n s , "Why did this

M A
2

No.
problem.

No, that's not a — m y

problem is to repair the

My problem is not t o — M r . Dockindorf is a man who

3 J is concerned with lawsuits, as he has been sued a number
4

of times for frivolous things.

5 j care what caused it.

Fix it."

And his view is:

M

We don't

And he's very pertinent

about

6

that,

7

Q

B

this matter, where you didn't officially try to f m a

9

what happened, did you unofficially or just as a matter cf

Apart from your official performance in this case in
oat

io

your own curiosity attempt to tina out what haa happenea,

n

why this break had occurred?

12

A

Well, when you arc working in the maintenance w o n : tnat

13 we are, it may run through our mind:

"Why did this happen?"

u

And if I was installing the system, what could I have done

15

to prevent it?

16

our consideration of it, especially on an old station tnat's

17

been there for a number oi vears.^

But that would be probably the extent of

That runs you into

is proolems in itself.
19

Q

20

that had been there for a number of years?

21

A

22 0
23

Is this what you would characterize as an old station

It's been there quite a while.
So in this instance I take it you didn't attempt to

figure out in your mind where the break had happened at the

24 (time you were repairing the break; is that correct?
25 |A

No.

I don't recall any discussions concerning it or

1

anything else of the sort.

2

going to be out of service?

3

don't spend time worrying about how it happened.

4

the time worrying about how you can get it back in service.

5

Q

6

did he ask you, "Do you have an opinion as to why that breaK

7

occurred?"

8

A

9

"That's not my responsibility."

"How long am I

When can we get back?"

So you

You spend

Now, when Mr. Dickman called you about this problem,

He may h a v e — h e may have asked me, but I told him,

It just seems to me that he did ask me if I thought

10
n

The point is:

it was, and I said:

"It's not my responsibility to determine

12 why.. It's my responsibility to repair it."
13 Q
M

Did he suggest to you any explanations for why it

occurred?

Did he say, " W e l l — "

15 A

No, I d o n ' t — I don't remember that he did.

16

Q

How about your conversations with Mr. Mitchell?

17

he suggested to you any explanations for why this break

18

occurred?

19

A

20

earthquake could have caused that; but, once again, it's

21

not my determination, and I told him so.

22

Q

How far is Gridley from Chico?

23

A

Approximately 37 miles.

24

Q

You didn't reside

25

A

Pardon me.

Has

He questioned me as to whether the possibility of the

in—

27 miles.

1

Q

2

period, did you?

3

A

No.

0

And you didn't work there either, did you, other than

4

You didn't reside in Gridley back in the 1986-1985

I was not residing there,

5

going from time to time to customers that might require your

6

services; is that correct?

7

A

Maintenance calls.

8

Q

To the extent that there may have been any sort of

9

earthquake in the Gridley area, your knowledge of that was

10

merely based on whatever you might have read in the papers

11

or had been told; is that correct?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

I should ask you, are you all right.

14

for a while here.

15

That would be the extent of my knowledge.
We've been going

(Discussion off the record.)

16

Q

17

any construction on property adjacent to this GasfnfSave

18

property?

19

A

No, I don't believe I did.

20

Q

What type of soil was actually there at the point at

21

which the break had occurred?

22

A

23

substantial amount of native soil around the lines.

24

Q

25

as American Environmental Management?

At the time that you did these repairs, did you observe

This area is an adobe clay.

There was—there was

Did you ever speak with anybody from a company known

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

A

I don't recall having done so.

Q

The only repair that you did was of this particular

break in the pipe at that time?
A

No.

We placed the entire lines from mat point up to

the dispensers.
Q

But that entire repair was solely because of the fact

that there was a break at that point in the pipe; is that
I correct?

9

(Witness nods head. )

10

IQ

11

A

12

than to repair the old line.

Yes?
Yes.

It's a simpler situation to put in a new line

13

J Q

14

• occasion to put gas back into the system to observe how much

When you found the particular leak, did you have any

15

gas would come out at any given interval?

16

A

17

final--the dispensers are badk on line and we are ready to

18

test for leaks.

19

pressure tests and have found no leaks.

20

we would put fuel into the lines and see if there was by

21

chance anything that we had missed before the system would

22

be covered up.

23

Q

Have you ever heard of a person named Evyleen Payne?

24

A

It doesn't strike anything in my recollection.

25

Q

How about Ray Rolls?

We do not put fuel back in the lines until we have a

By that time we have tested our lines with
And then thereafter

1

A

2

that I associate with anytning.

3

0

Not with this case, I take it?

A

No.

4

I've heard the name, but it's not—it's not anything

There is an engineering company in Chico by the

5

name of Rolls, I think it is. Other than that, I don't

6

associate it with anything.

7

MR. OLSON:

8
9

I believe that's ail I have.

EXAMINATION BY MR. MITCHELL
Q

In your testimony, sir, you stated thar you would

w 1 estimate there was .25 percent corrosion tc x ne jas line at
n

the place where you repaired it; is that correct?

12

A

Yes.

13

0

What do you mean by 25 percent corrosion?

14

A

Approximately 25 percent of the pipe in areas theie

15

would be approximately 25 percent of the pipe was not there.

16

In other words, it had rusted away probably 25 percent of

17

the existing thickness of the pipe,

18

Q

19

does that mean that the pipe has to be replaced, or is it

20

still fit to remain in the ground?

21

A

22

you can't sufficiently rethread the pipe to get a fitting

23

on it.

24

possibly thread, and you would have notches into your thread.

25

So it wouldn't seal.

When there has been 25 percent corrosion in the pipe,

Oh, no.

No.

25 percent corrosion is just enough that

There would be deep areas in it that would not

1
2
3

0

So the pipe still maintains its strength?

A

A substantial amount of its strength, yes.

0

And it's perfectly okay to remain in the ground a n d —

4

(Witness nods head.)

b

MR. OLSON:

6

question.

7

A

8

Object to the leading nature of the

It's there and would be there and probably in more

I stations than we would li*e to know of.

9

Q

(By Mr. Mitchell)

10

of its life?

11

A

12

I

13

J A

14

Q

Would that be essentially 25 percent

No, sir.
MR. OLSON:

Objection.

No, it wouldn't have anything to do with its life.
(By Mr. Mitchell)

15

MR. OLSON:

Was this break caused by corrosion?

Objection.

16

A

It would be illogical.

17

Q

(By Mr. Mitchell)

18

A

Illogical.

19

| Q

21

I A

22

Q

23

over many years?

25

I A

Illogical?

Why?
MR. OLSON:

24

No foundation.

Objection.

Again, no foundation.

Corrosion does not cause a clean break.
(By Mr. Mitchell)

That's based upon your experience

My experience in dealing with the product.
MR. MITCHELL:

I don't have anything further.

1

MR. OLSON:

2

Nothing further.

(At 2:37 p.m. the deposition ended.)

3
4

Witness

5
6

7
8
9

County of Salt Lake

)
) ss.

State of Utah

)

This is to certify that the witness read the foregoing
I deposition; and if there are any changes to be made, they

10 ia r e indicated by the witness on the attached correction
n

I sheet.

'2
13

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

I

day of

, 1988,

14

Notary Public

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

My commission expires
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(vi)

I.
JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) and (4) (1987).

II.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW

1. Was the district court correct in granting Appellees
Gridley Associates, Ltd., Petroleum Management, Inc. and Vernon
G.W. Dickman (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Gridley
Associates11) summary judgment on the basis that the gasoline
spill at Gridley Associates1 self-service gasoline station in
Gridley, California, which was discovered in February of 1986,
was "sudden" within the meaning of the insurance policy issued
by Appellant Transamerica Insurance Company ("Transamerica") as
a matter of law under the undisputed facts and was thus covered
under the policy?
2.

In the

alternative, even

if it

is assumed

for

purposes of argument that the gasoline spill was not "sudden"
within the meaning of the policy, is Transamerica barred from
denying

coverage

on that basis as a matter

of

law

because

Transamerica never raised that contention until over three years
after the spill when Transamerica filed its motion for partial
summary judgment in the district court?

1

3,

Can issue 2 above properly be decided on this

appeal?
The foregoing issues present questions of law which this
court reviews without according any particular deference to the
district court's decision.

III.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, rules
or regulations which are determinative of the issues raised by
this appeal.

IV.
INTRODUCTION

This

case

arose

out

of

a gasoline

spill

from an

underground metal pipe running from an underground storage tank
to a gasoline pump at Gridley Associates1 self-service gasoline
station in Gridley, California. The spill, which was discovered
in February of 1986, resulted from a clean break in the pipe
caused by some type of earth movement such as that caused by an
earthquake or heavy equipment.

The Transamerica policy issued

to Gridley Associates provided coverage for gas spills if they
were "sudden and accidental."

Transamerica initially agreed

that the loss was covered by its policy and in fact paid a

2

portion of the cleanup costs.

However, several months later

Transamerica reneged on its coverage agreement and refused to
pay the very substantial cleanup costs necessary to clean up the
spill or to defend Gridley Associates in two lawsuits commenced
by third parties to recover damages caused by the spill.
The various positions taken by Transamerica over the
years in denying coverage under the policy for the spill were a
tribute

to

the

ingenuity

of

Transamerica

and

its counsel.

Transamerica tried on for size at one point or another literally
every defense to coverage possible.

Then, three years after the

spill and three law firms later, Transamerica filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment in the district court shortly before
the

scheduled

trial

date

of

this

case.

In

that

Motion,

Transamerica raised for the first time the argument that the
gasoline spill was not covered under the policy because the
policy only provided coverage for spills which were "sudden and
accidental11 and the Gridley spill was supposedly not "sudden."
For

the

respectfully

reasons

submitted

hereinafter

that

set

the- district

forth,
court

it

is

correctly

rejected Transamerica!s contention and determined as a matter of
law that the spill was indeed "sudden."

In the alternative,

Transamerica

law

undisputed

is

barred

facts below

as

a matter

from arguing

of

that the

based

upon

the

spill was not

"sudden" because that contention was not raised for over three
years after the spill occurred.
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V.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

The Proceedings in the District Court.

Gridley

Associates

commenced

this

lawsuit

in

1988

seeking a determination that the gasoline spill at the Gridley
Station was covered under Transamerica's policy and to recover
damages from Transamerica on various theories, including breach
of contract, fraud, bad faith refusal to pay, declaratory relief
and estoppel.

[R. 2-71]

an Amended Complaint.

Thereafter, Gridley Associates filed

[R. 198-268]

Substantial discovery was

completed by the parties and the case was scheduled for trial on
June 13, 1989.

[R. 324]

In April, 1989, shortly before the scheduled trial date,
Transamerica

filed

a

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment,

contending for the first time that the gasoline spill was not
covered under Transamerica's policy because it was not "sudden."
[R. 327-365]
minute

entry

On May
denying

12, 1989, the district court issued a
Transamerica*s motion

and

ruling

matter of law that the gasoline leak was "sudden."

as a

[R. 542]

Because the district court had rejected the only ground upon
which Transamerica then relied to avoid coverage, the effect of
the ruling was to grant summary judgment in favor of Gridley
Associates that the gasoline spill was in fact covered under
Transamericafs policy.
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Transamerica and Gridley Associates then entered into a
Settlement Agreement pursuant to which Transamerica agreed to
pay a minimum agreed to amount towards the damages and cleanup
costs of the spill.

Transamerica reserved the right, however,

in the event that the cleanup costs exceeded the agreed to
settlement amount, to appeal the district court's ruling that
the gasoline spill was "sudden."

Transamerica agreed that the

only contention it would thereafter be entitled to make in this
litigation was that the gasoline spill was not covered because,
as a matter of law, it was not "sudden."
The cleanup costs in fact exceeded the agreed to minimum
settlement amount and Transamerica exercised its right to appeal
the district court's ruling.

The parties stipulated to the

entry of a final judgment in favor of Gridley Associates and on
December 13, 1990, the district court entered a partial summary
judgment in favor of Gridley Associates which was certified as
final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

It

is from this judgment that Transamerica has appealed.

B.

Objection to Transamericafs Factual Statements.

Gridley

Associates

objects to

the

following

factual

statements contained in Transamerica's Brief.
1.

Transamerica states that the "leak occurred in a

section of the pipe which had been weakened

by the gradual

process of electrolysis," implying that the underground gasoline
pipe simply gradually corroded away.
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[Transamerica Brief, p. 6]
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issue, testified that all metal pipes gradually corrode over the
years through the process of electrolysis and that there had
been approximately

25% corrosion

in this pipe, meaning that

approximately

25% of the existing thickness of the pipe had

rusted away.

However, Mr. Hankins testified that the pipe still

retained a substantial amount of its strength and that the break
was not caused by corrosion because corrosion does not cause a
clean break.
the earth.
pp.

The break was caused by some type of movement of
[Hankins Depo., Appendix G to Transamerica Brief,

9-10, 58-59]
2.

Transamerica states that the gas spill continued

over a period of four months.
fact,

although

the precise

[Transamerica Brief, p. 24]
period

of time which

the

In

spill

continued is unknown, it appears from the records of gas lost
that the underground pipe broke in late November of 1985. [See
summary of gasoline lost set forth on page 5 of Transamerica's
Brief]
1986.

The break was discovered and repaired in early February,
Thus, the spill continued for a period of approximately

2 1/2 months.

C.

Statement of Facts.

The following facts were undisputed in the court below:
1.

At all relevant times, Gridley Associates owned and

still owns a self-service gasoline station located in Gridley,
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California

(the "Gridley Station").

[R. 200; Transamerica

Brief, p. 4]
2.

During the period of time from February 7, 1985

through March 7, 1986, the Gridley Station was covered under a
policy of insurance issued by Transamerica (the "Policy").

The

Policy was a renewal Policy and covered other gas stations as
well.

[R. 199-200; Transamerica Brief, p. 4]
3.

In early 1986, Gridley Associates suspected gas may

be leaking at the Gridley Station.

In February, 1986, Gridley

Associates asked Dockindorf Equipment Company to conduct an
investigation to determine if it could

find any gas leak.

During the course of the investigation, Dockindorf discovered
that an underground metal gas line running from the underground
gasoline storage tank containing regular gasoline to a fuel pump
had broken.

As a result of this break, every time the gasoline

pump was activated by a customer, gasoline leaked underground.
[Hankins Depo., Appendix G to Transamerica Brief, pp. 6-12]
4.

The underground pipe had a clean break caused by

some type of earth movement such as is caused by an earthquake
or heavy equipment.

[Kankins Depo., Appendix G to Transamerica

Brief, pp. 10-12]
5.

After the leak was discovered, Gridley Associates

was required to undertake an extensive cleanup program. Gridley
Associates hired American Environmental Management Co. to handle
the cleanup which has not yet been completed.

In March, 1986,

Gridley Associates made claim under the Policy for the costs of
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cleanup.

Robert Lakata ("Lakata") at the Sacramento office of

Transamerica initially handled the claim.

[ R. 604, Lakata

Depo., p. 10]
6.

During

April

and

early

May

of

1986, Lakata

investigated the claim and had various communications with Ray
Yenchick ("Yenchick") who was a senior casualty underwriter for
Transamerica

in the Denver office.

Yenchick

in turn had

communications concerning the claim with Ray Hood, the casualty
claims supervisor for the Denver region.

[R.

604, Lakata

Depo., pp. 17-28 and Ex. 4 thereto; Yenchick Depo., Appendix A
hereto, pp. 12, 25-35]
7.

The Policy contained a general pollution exclusion

which excluded coverage for pollution spills unless they were
"sudden and accidental."

Unbeknownst to Gridley Associates or

to Transamericafs agent, Transamerica had also inserted into the
Policy a separate "absolute" pollution exclusion endorsement
(not the pollution exclusion which Transamerica now relies upon)
not contained in the prior policies which absolutely excluded
any

coverage

for pollution

spills

and which

Transamerica

initially believed excluded any and all pollution claims under
the Policy.

However, after discussion between the Transamerica

personnel, Transamerica determined that the Gridley Associates1
claim was in fact covered under the "garage" coverage portion of
the Policy to which the absolute pollution exclusion did not
apply. It was further decided by Transamerica that Transamerica
should not attempt to escape coverage by contending that the
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general pollution exclusion contained in the Policy (upon which
Transamerica now relies) applied on the basis that the spill was
not "sudden and accidental.ff

In this regard, on May 1, 1986,

Yenchick noted in a file memo that:
In checking through file, we have pollution
exclusion on G.L. [general liability] coverage, but
not on garage.
5-1-86
I discussed this claim w/Ray Hood-Denver
claims.
Since we do not have the absolute
pollution excl. on the garage coverage, he does not
believe the "sudden and accidental" provision in
the policy will hold up. . . .
Called Bob Lakata-advised him to provide
coverage rather than risk causing a legal battle.

[R. 604, Lakata Depo., pp. 28-29; R. 398, Yenchick Depo.,
Appendix A hereto, pp. 33-35 and Ex. 3] [Emphasis added]
8.

On May 2, 1986, Yenchick sent Lakata a memorandum,

which stated:
Per our phone conversation, I believe we
should go ahead and provide coverage for this
claim.
I discussed the situation with Ray HoodDenver casualty claims supervisor - and he is of
the same opinion.
Since we do not have the
absolute
pollution
exclusion
on
the
garage
coverage, we do not believe the policy's "sudden
and accidental" provision will carry much weight in
court. Rather than get tied up in a legal battle,
which could be costly, I believe it would be much
wiser to settle the claim.
[R. 604, Lakata Depo., p. 28 and Ex. 7 thereto; R. 400,
Yenchick Depo., Appendix A hereto, pp. 33-37] [Emphasis
added]
9.

Based

upon

the

communications

between

Lakata,

Yenchick and Hood, Lakata advised Gridley Associates in early
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May, 1986 that the claim was, in fact, covered

and that

Transamerica would pay the cleanup costs to be incurred.
604, Lakata Depo., pp. 28-29]

[R.

In this regard, Lakata wrote a

note to his file on May 5, 1986 stating:
Received Yenchickfs 5/2/86; was contacted by
Richard Burbidge (801-355-6677) insured's personal
attorney. Informed him that our present position
was that coverage applicable. I told him that we
would not pay for testing or repairing the tanks or
gas lines, only for cleaning up the adjoining
property.
[R. 604, Lakata Depo., pp. 26-29 and Ex. 4 thereto]
10.

In October, 1986, eight months after the spill was

discovered, Transamerica issued Gridley Associates a check for
$23,473.49 in payment of cleanup costs which had been billed to
that date. At the same time, Transamerica attempted to reverse
its previous agreement to provide coverage. Barbara Gilbert, an
environmental claims attorney with Transamerica's home office,
wrote Gridley Associates a letter dated October 9, 1986 advising
Gridley Associates that Transamerica took the position that
cleanup costs were not covered because:
pollution exclusion excluded coverage; and

(a) the absolute
(b) that to the

extent any alleged damages occurred on property owned or leased
by Gridley Associates, there would be no coverage under the
Policy.

Transamerica did not take the position that the spill

had not been "sudden and accidental.11

[R. 603, Gilbert Depo.,

pp. 50-51 and Ex. 12 thereto]
11.

On the same date that Ms. Gilbert advised Gridley

Associates that the claim wasn't covered, she wrote a letter to
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Transamerica's
Gallagher,

coverage

attorney

acknowledging

that

in

Philadelphia,

Transamerica

previously agreed to provide coverage.

had,

Michael
in

fact,

Ms. Gilbert stated,

among other things, that:
As you can see, we have gone ahead and paid
for the cleanup costs associated with this oil
spill.
You will recall that there was some
considerable
confusion was
to whether
our
Sacramento office had agreed to cover this claim.
On September 28, 1986, I spoke with Mr. Bob Lakata
of our Sacramento field office and he confirmed
that he did, in fact, advise the insured's personal
counsel that we would be covering the claim.
[R. 603, Gilbert Depo., p. 53-54 and Ex. 13 thereto]
12 •
attorney

On November 25, 1986, Transamerica's coverage

in

Associates

Philadelphia, Michael

Gallagher,

sent

Gridley

a letter denying coverage under the Policy for

cleanup costs. Mr. Gallagher stated that cleanup costs "do not
come within the definition of -damages as provided for in the
Transamerica policy" and that the absolute pollution exclusion
excluded any coverage.

Again, Transamerica did not take the

position that the spill had not been "sudden and accidental."
[R. 603, Gilbert Depo., p. 56-57 and Ex. 15 thereto]
13.

By

letter

dated

December

23,

1986, Gridley

Associates1 counsel disputed the denial of coverage.

[R. 413-

414]
14.
Transamerica

Thereafter,
retained the

during

the

first

firm of Smylie

part

of 1987,

& Selman

in Los

Angeles, California as new coverage counsel with respect to the
matter.

[R. 602, James Depo., p. 10]

11

Set of Interrogatories, Transamerica specifically stated that
the grounds relied upon for its contention that the losses
suffered by Gridley Associates as claimed in this action are not
covered

under the Policy were stated

in the letters from

Transamerica•s counsel referred to above, dated November 25,
1986, September 25, 1987, October 1, 1987, January 21, 1988, and
May 11, 1988. Again, there was no mention of any claim that the
Gridley spill was not "sudden and accidental."

[R. 376-77 J

Appendix C hereto]

VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The gasoline spill was "sudden" as a matter of law.

The spill resulted from a clean break in the gas line caused by
some type of earth movement such as caused by heavy equipment or
an earthquake.

The pollution exclusion in the Policy issued by

Transamerica is generally used by insurance companies throughout
the United States.

Many courts have found the word "sudden" in

the policy to be ambiguous because the word has more than one
meaning

and

have

therefore

determined

interpreted in favor of the insured.

the

word

must

be

These courts have defined

"sudden" to mean "unexpected" by the insured, and have found
that the pollution

exclusion

simply

intentional pollution by the insured.
that line of cases.

excludes

coverage

for

This court should adopt

Other courts have found the word "sudden"

as used in the Policy to be unambiguous.
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Most of these courts

have defined "sudden" as "happening without prior notice or with
brief notice."
Under

either

line of cases, Gridley

entitled to coverage in the present case.

Associates

is

The gasoline spill

was "sudden" because the gas line break and the resultant
discharge

of gas

previous notice.

was

unexpected

and

happened

without any

The fact the spill continued undetected for 2

1/2 months does not mean the discharge was not "sudden."

The

important point is whether the commencement of the spill was
"sudden."

No

case

has

denied

coverage

under

facts even

approaching those in the present case.
2.

Even if it is assumed for purposes of argument that

the gasoline spill was not "sudden" within the express terms of
the Policy, nevertheless Transamerica is barred as a matter of
law from denying coverage on that basis because Transamerica did
not raise that ground for denying coverage for over three years
after the gasoline spill occurred.

Transamerica did not even

raise that ground for denial of coverage in its Answers to the
Complaint

or

Amended

Complaint

on

in

its

Answers

to

Interrogatories in this case. An insurer is barred from raising
an additional ground for denial of coverage after commencement
of litigation which would have been uncovered by a reasonable
investigation.

Transamerica was fully aware of the facts

surrounding the gasoline spill and made the conscious decision
back in 1986 not to assert that the spill was not "sudden" as a
defense to coverage.
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3.

Gridley Associates1 argument that Transamerica is

barred as a matter of law from denying coverage on the basis the
Gridley spill was not "sudden" was properly before the district
court and is properly part of this appeal.

Although the

district court did not reach the bar issue because the court
determined that the spill was "sudden" as a matter of law,
Gridley Associates asserted the bar argument below and this
court can affirm the district court's judgment on any proper
ground, whether or not relied upon by the district court.

VII.
ARGUMENT

A.

THE GASOLINE SPILL WAS "SUDDEN" WITHIN THE MEANING

OF THE POLICY AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Transamerica

does

not

(and

could

not

under

the

settlement agreement between the parties) seek reversal of the
summary judgment on the basis that material issues of fact
exist.

Rather, Transamerica argues that the district court

erred in determining based on the undisputed facts that the
gasoline

spill

was

"sudden"

within

the

meaning

Transamerica policy issued to Gridley Associates.

of

the

For the

reasons set forth below, it is respectfully submitted that the
district court's ruling was entirely correct and should be
affirmed.
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The Policy issued to Gridley Associates by Transamerica
was a standard "occurrence11 based policy utilized throughout the
insurance industry.

The general coverage provisions of the

Policy provided that Gridley Associates was entitled to recover
any

losses

for property

damage caused by

an "occurrence."

"Occurrence" was, in turn, defined in the Policy as:
An accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to conditions, which results in bodily
injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured.
[Emphasis added]
The

Policy

also contained

various

limited its general scope of coverage.
was

an

"absolute"

pollution

exclusions which

One of these exclusions

exclusion

which

Transamerica

originally relied upon in denying coverage to Gridley Associates
and which excluded all pollution spills from coverage.

The

absolute pollution exclusion is not relied upon by Transamerica
on this appeal, nor was it relied upon by Transamerica in moving
for partial summary judgment below because, as Transamerica
itself finally recognized, that exclusion did not apply to the
garage coverage portion of the Policy.

Rather, Transamerica

contended for the first time in its Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment that another more narrow pollution exclusion contained
in the Policy excluded coverage.

That pollution exclusion

provided that:
This insurance does not apply . . . to bodily
injury or property damage arising out of the
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke,
vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies, toxic
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials, or
other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or
upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or
18

body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if
such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is
sudden and accidental. [Emphasis added]
The evidence was uncontradicted in the district court
that the Gridley gas spill was caused by a clean break in the
underground gas line running from the underground gasoline
storage tank to one of the fuel pumps at the Gridley Station.
The spill continued for approximately 2 1/2 months each time
that the fuel pump was activated.

Based upon these undisputed

facts, Transamerica erroneously contended below and reasserts on
this appeal that the spill was not "sudden" because it continued
for more than a "brief" period of time.

Transamerica cites

numerous cases trying to support this position.

There is,

however, a glaring omission from Transamericafs brief. With one
exception, Transamerica carefully omits to recite for the court
any of the facts of the cases upon which Transamerica relies.
The reason for this omission is transparent. The facts of those
cases bear no resemblance to the case at bar.

Each case relied

upon by Transamerica in which coverage was denied on the basis
that a spill was not "sudden" involved intentional pollution
occurring as part of the regular course of business over a
number of years.
Transamerica tries to make the battleground issue of
this appeal whether this court should adopt the reasoning of the
many courts which have held the use of the word "sudden" in the
standard insurance policy to be ambiguous or whether this court
should follow the reasoning of other cases finding the language
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to be unambiguous.

Although Gridley Associates believes this

court should adopt the reasoning of the former cases, it is
respectfully submitted that the gasoline spill in the present
case

"sudden11

was

under

either

line

of

cases

and

that

Transamerica•s position that the gasoline spill is not "sudden"
unless it is of brief duration finds no support in the vast
majority of decisions rendered under both lines of cases.

1.
"Sudden11

Many Cases Have Found the Undefined Use of the Word

to

Be

Ambiguous

and

to

Mean

"Unexpected"

by

the

Insured,

Many courts have found that the undefined use of the
term

"sudden" in the standard

insurance policy

because the word has more than one meaning.

is ambiguous

These courts have

interpreted that ambiguous term in favor of the insured to mean
"unexpected" by the insured, thus only precluding intentional
pollution from coverage.

Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 380

S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 1989).
The

case

of

Broadwell

Realty

Services, Inc. v.

The

Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York., 528 A.2d 76 (N.J. 1987)
is directly on point and is a good example of the position which
Gridley

Associates

Broadwell,
fissures

in

gasoline
an

believes
had

this

leaked

underground

Court

for

gasoline
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should

several
tank

on

adopt.

months
the

In

through
insured's

property.

The insurance company contended that the gasoline

spill was not covered because it was not "sudden."
The Broadwell court rejected the insurance company's
contention.

The court reasoned that the meaning of the word

"sudden" as used in the policy was ambiguous, that the meaning
had received a great deal of attention in the cases over the
years and had created a substantial amount of controversy.
Nevertheless, the insurance industry had not seen fit to settle
the issue by including more precise wording in its policies,
which would have put the controversy beyond reasonable question.
Therefore, the court said that any ambiguity had to be resolved
against the insurer.
In arriving at a definition of "sudden" as used in the
insurance policy, the Broadwell court reviewed in depth the
history of the general comprehensive liability policy and the
pollution exclusion utilized by the insurance industry.

The

court noted that prior to 1966 the standard policy in the
industry

covered

only property

damage

and personal

injury

"caused by accident" and that the word "accident" was undefined,
leaving the definition up to the courts.

In 1966, the standard

policy was revised to provide for "occurrence" based coverage in
response to consumer demands for broader liability protection
and

in acquiescence

to the

judicial

expansive reading of the word "accident."

trend

toward

a more

[528 A. 2d at 84] The

standard occurrence based policy defined "occurrence" the same
as does Transamericafs Policy in the present case.
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The

general

pollution

exclusion

relied

upon

by

Transamerica in the present case was added by the 197 3 revision
to the general comprehensive liability policy.

The Broadwell

court noted that according to the commentators, "the exclusion
was designed to decrease claims for losses caused by pollution
by

providing

an

incentive

to

industry

manufacturing and disposal processes."

to

improve

its

[528 A.2d at 85] Thus,

the insured could not recover under the policy if he knowingly
polluted

the

environment.

The

court

concluded

that

the

exclusion was only designed to eliminate coverage for pollution
which was expected or intended by the insured, observing:
There is substantial authority supporting the
thesis that the pollution exclusion was intended to
be co-extensive with the scope of the definition of
occurrence. [Citation omitted] Citing statements
made by the Insurance Service Office, commentators
have argued that "limitation of coverage was
intended to apply only to the intentional
polluter." The pollution exclusion is [thus
considered] an intentional polluter's exclusion,
and, as such, [is] inapplicable to entities which
neither expect not intend their conduct to result
in bodily injury or property damage. [Citations
omitted] Although this argument has its detractors
[Citations omitted], most commentators "view the
[policy limitation] as only a typical exclusion for
intentionally caused damage by industrial or
commercial dumpers." [Citation omitted]
. . .

We agree with this analysis. In our view, the
pollution exclusion focuses upon the intention,
expectation and foresight of the insured. If an
insured knows that liability incurred by a
foreseeable polluting event is covered by his
policy, he is tempted to diminish his precautions
and relax his vigilance. Conversely, we perceive
no sound basis anchored in the policy language
which requires prescience or clairvoyance on the
part of the insured. Where the insured has taken
reasonable precautions against contaminating the
environment and the dispersal of pollutants is both
accidental and unforeseen, we are of the view that
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the "sudden and accidental" exception to the
exclusion is applicable and the loss is thereby
covered by the policy.
[528 A.2d at 85-86]
In United Pacific Ins. Co, v. Ban's West Lake Union,
Inc.. 664 P.2d 1262 (Wash. 1983), the court affirmed a summary
judgment that loss caused

by gasoline

leaking out of the

insured's gasoline line over a period of several months was
covered under the policy.

In so ruling, the court concluded

that the courts considering the pollution exclusion clause had
"almost unanimously held it to be ambiguous."
12 65]

[664 P. 2d at

The court then observed that:
In the case before us, the liability insurance
policy on the one hand covers an "occurrence",
which by policy definition includes conditions
which are continuing in nature (as the insured
argues), while on the other hand the pollution
exclusion clause in the policy excludes from
coverage damages arising out of the escape of
liquids, gases and other substances unless the
escape is sudden (as the insured argues is the
situation presented) . Both cannot be true yet both
positions are reasonable, hence, the policy is
ambiguous and requires judicial interpretation. It
then follows that ambiguities in the policy are to
be construed against the insurer which wrote the
policy and in favor of the insured — particularly
where an exclusion is involved as it is here.
. . .

The pollution exclusion was also added by the
1973 standard revisions. The exclusion "eliminates
coverage for damages arising out of pollution or
contamination, where such damages appear to be
expected or intended on the part of the insured and
hence are excluded by definition of 'occurrence. ,lf
[664 P.2d at 1264-1266]
In New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Co. , 673 F.Supp 1359 (D.Del. 1987), the court held the pollution
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exclusion

was

inapplicable

under

the

facts

of

that

case,

observing:
. . . [A]n ambiguous term in an insurance contract
is considered in favor of the insured and strictly
against the insurer.
[Citations omitted]
An
ambiguity is created when the terms of a contract
permit two or more reasonable interpretations.
[Citations omitted]
The primary dictionary definition of the word
"sudden" is "happening without previous notice" or
"occurring unexpectedly."
Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, at 2284 (1971); See
Black f s Law Dictionary, at 1284 (1979).
While
other definitions indicate that the word has
connotations of brevity, this only suggests that
the word has more than one reasonable definition.
In summary, the Court holds that the plain
meaning of the word "sudden" as used in the
pollution exclusion is ambiguous.
Resolving the
ambiguity in favor of the insured, the Court rules
that
the
term
"sudden" means
a discharge,
dispersal, release or escape of pollutants that is
unexpected.
[673 F.Supp. at 1362-1364]
In Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 380 S.E.2d 686
(Ga. 1989), the City of Jacksonville, Florida contracted to use
property owned by Claussen as a landfill.
the

city

dumped

exclusively.

industrial

and

chemical

Beginning in 1971,
waste

there

almost

The city closed the site in 1977 and returned it

to Claussen entirely filled, graded and seeded.

Claussen had no

knowledge that the site was used for dumping hazardous wastes.
In 1985, the Environmental Protection Agency informed Claussen
that he was responsible for cleaning up the site.
brought

an

pollution

action
was

seeking

covered

a

under

declaratory
his

Claussen then

judgment

insurance

that

policy,

the

which

contained the same pollution exclusion as does Transamericafs
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Policy.

The

Claussen

court

concluded

that the

pollution

exclusion was capable of more than one reasonable interpretation
and therefore "sudden and accidental" must be construed in favor
of the insured to mean "unexpected and unintended."

The court

rejected Aetna's argument that the dumping of toxic wastes
occurring over several years was not "sudden" within the policy
language.

In reaching this conclusion, the court said:

Georgia courts have long acknowledged that
insurance policies are prepared and proposed by
insurers.
Thus, if an insurance contract is
capable of being construed two ways, it will be
construed against the insurance company and in
favor of the insured. [Citations omitted]
What is the meaning of the word "sudden" as it
is used in the insurance policy? Claussen argues
that it means "unexpected." Aetna asserts that the
only possible meaning is "abrupt." This seemingly
simple question has spawned a profusion of
litigation. The majority of courts considering the
issue have adopted the meaning asserted by
Claussen. [Citations omitted] Other courts have
decided that "sudden" cannot be defined without its
temporal connotation. [Citations omitted]
The primary dictionary definition of the word
is "happening without previous or with very brief
notice; coming or occurring unexpectedly; not
foreseen or prepared for."
[Citations omitted]
The definition of the word "sudden" as "abrupt" is
also recognized in several dictionaries and is
common in the vernacular. Perhaps, the secondary
meaning is so common in their vernacular that it
is, indeed, difficult to think of "sudden" without
a temporal connotation, a sudden flash, a sudden
burst of speed, a sudden bang. But, on reflection
one realizes that, even in its popular usage,
"sudden" does not usually describe the duration of
an event, but rather its unexpectedness: a sudden
storm, a sudden turn in the road, sudden death.
Even when used to describe the onset of an event,
the word has an elastic temporal connotation that
varies with expectations: suddenly, it's spring.
[Citation omitted] Thus, it appears that "sudden"
has more than one reasonable meaning. And, under
the pertinent rule of construction, the meaning
favoring the insured must be applied, that is,
"unexpected."
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{380 S.E.2d at 688]
The Claussen court also rejected the contention raised
by Transamerica in the present case that this interpretation of
"sudden11 just restated the definition of "occurrence11:
The policy goes on to describe "occurrence" as
"property damage neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured."
Aetna contends
that if "sudden" is interpreted as "unexpected," it
simply restates the definition of "occurrence." We
do not agree.
The pollution exclusion clause
focuses on whether the "discharge, dispersal or
release" of the pollutants is unexpected and
unintended; the definition of occurrence focuses on
whether the property damage is unexpected and
unintended.
The pollution exclusion
clause
therefore has the effect of eliminating coverage
for damage resulting from the intentional discharge
of pollutants.
[380 S.E.2d at 688-689]
In Summit Assoc, v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. , 550 A.2d
1235 (N.J. 1988) , a developer purchased real estate which had
been used as a sewage treatment facility twenty years earlier.
The developer

did

not

know that

any portion

of the

sewage

treatment facility remained buried at the site, nor that there
was any sludge or hazardous substance buried there.

In the

course of preparing the site for development, an underground
pipe leading from a large underground sludge pit was disturbed
and

began

leaking

hazardous

substantial period of time.

liquid

which

continued

for

a

The court rejected the insurance

company*s contention that the spill was excluded from coverage
by

the pollution

exclusion,

ruling
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that

the

exclusion

only

eliminated coverage where the damage appeared to be expected or
intended by the insured.
In Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 813
(Mich. 1989), the court affirmed a summary judgment against the
insurance company determining that the leakage of toxic byproducts through holes in a corroded underground storage tank
which continued for a period of weeks was in fact "sudden" as
used in the pollution exclusion clause because the leak was
unexpected.
Numerous
interpretation
insured.

of

other

courts

"sudden"

as

have
meaning

adopted

the

"unexpected"

same
by

the

See, e.g. , Benedictine Sisters v. St. Paul Fire and

Marine Ins. . 815 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1987) (soot discharged from
boiler over a period of six months was "sudden"); Shapiro v.
Public Service Mut. Ins. Co.. All
leaking from corroded underground

N.E.2d 146 (Mass. 1985) (oil
fuel tank into surrounding

waterways over a period of time was "sudden"); Kipin Industries
v. American Univ. Ins., 535 N.E.2d 334

(Ohio 1987); Allstate

Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980)

(gasoline

leaking from underground storage tank over a period of time was
"sudden"); Du-Wel Products v. U.S. Fire Ins., 565 A.2d 1113,
1117

(N.J.

1989)

(all that

is required

to qualify

for the

exception to the exclusion is that the continuous discharge of
the pollutants be unintended

(i.e. accidental) and unexpected

(i.e. sudden)); Headlev v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
712 F.Supp 745 (D.S.Dak. 1989); Reliance Ins. Co. of Illinois v.
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Martin,

467 N.E.2d

287

(111. 1984):

Buckeye

Union

Ins. v.

Liberty Solvents and Chemicals Co. , Inc., 477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ohio
1984); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495
(Minn. 1988) ; New England Gas & E. Assoc, v. Ocean Ace, and
Guar. Corp.. 116 N.E.2d 671, 680 (Mass. 1953).
This

court

recently

stated

in C.J.

Realtor

Inc. v.

Willev. 758 P.2d 923, 928-929 (Utah App. 1988) that a contract
is ambiguous when it admits of two or more plausible meanings.
The most that can be said about the pollution exclusion in the
present

case

ambiguous.

from

Transamerica • s

standpoint

is

that

it

Therefore, the exclusion must be interpreted

favor of the insured.

is
in

See, e.g. , Fuller v. Director of Finance,

694 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1985); Utah Farm Bureau v. Orville Andrews
and Sons, 665 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Utah 1983).

2.

The

Gridlev

Spill

Was

"Sudden" Even Under

The

Decisions Which Have Found the Word "Sudden" to be Unambiguous.

Other courts have found that-the word "sudden" as used
in the standard insurance policy is not ambiguous.

Most of

these courts have defined "sudden" to mean "happening without
prior

notice

or

with

brief

notice," which

dictionary definition of the word.

UNEXPECTED."

of

"abrupt"

is

the

primary

Some of these courts have

also added "abrupt" to the definition.
definition

is

However, the primary

"occurring

without

warning:

[Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1989]
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Utilizing

these

definitions,

the

cases

relied

upon

by

Transamerica have denied coverage for intentional pollution
occurring as part of the regular course of the polluter's
business over a period of years even if the polluter did not
intend or expect the resulting damage. These cases all involved
pollution that occurred gradually rather than being sudden
because of some accident such as a gas line break as in the
present case. The facts involved in those cases are light years
away from the facts in the present case.
For example, in Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated F.M. Ins.
Co. , 682 F.Supp 927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), a case relied upon by
Transamerica, it was alleged that the insured had during the
regular course of its business deposited radioactive waste on
its property for years as part of its production of phosphoric
acid.

In fact, the radioactive waste was 35 feet high and

covered an area of 3 0 to 4 0 acres.

In denying coverage, the

court said:
This Court does not find the pollution
exclusion involved in this" case to be ambiguous.
The "sudden and accidental11 exception expressly
applies to the "discharge, dispersal, release or
escape" of the pollutants rather than to the harm
caused by the pollutants. "Sudden" in its common
usage, means "happening without previous notice or
with very brief notice," while "accidental" means
"occurring sometimes with unfortunate results by
chance alone."
. . .

Several other courts have held that the
pollution exclusion applied to the release of waste
on a regular basis or in the ordinary course of
business. . . .
In the case at bar, Amocofs complaint alleges
that Borden regular deposited radioactive wastes on
its property as part of its production of
phosphoric acid. . . . Clearly, this is not an
29

allegation of a "sudden and accidental" event.
Rather, it is precisely the type of activity which
the pollution exclusion was drafted to preclude.
[682 F.Supp at 930]

[Emphasis added]

In International Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins., 522 N.E.2d 758 (111. 1988), another case relied upon
by Transamerica, the insured as a normal part of its business
and

over

hazardous

a

long

waste

period
onto

of

the

time

ground

intentionally
as

part

of

discharged
its

barrel

reconditioning business.

In holding that the discharge had not

been

noted

sudden,

the

court

that

the

dictionary

defined

"sudden" as "happening without previous notice or with very
brief notice; abrupt, characterized by hastiness."

[522 N.E.2d

at 769]
In State of N.Y. v. Amro Realty Corp., 697 F.Supp 99
(N.D.N.Y. 1988), cited by Transamerica, the insured had polluted
the environment by disposing of toxic solvents into drains and
septic systems as part of the regular course of its business
from the early 1950s through 1981.

In denying coverage, the

court determined that the word "sudden" was not ambiguous and
remarked:
There can be very little dispute that "sudden"
means happening without previous notice or on very
brief notice; unforseen; unexpected; unprepared
for,
Webster's
New
International
Dictionary,
(2d.Ed. Unabridged 1954), and that "accidental" is
defined as happening unexpectedly or by chance;
taking place not according to usual course, Id.
Even if the term accidental is determined from the
insured's point of view, there is no use of the
word "sudden" which is consistent with events
transpiring over a twenty year period. . . . This
court doubts that the New York Court of Appeals
would
choose to emasculate
an
act of the
30

Legislature. Rather, the Court of Appeals would be
persuaded by the logic of other courts which have
addressed
this
issue
and
determined
that
allegations of continuous industrial pollution are
clearly outside of the "sudden and accidental"
exception to the pollution exclusion clause.
[Citations omitted]
[697 F.Supp at 110]

[Emphasis added]

In U.S. Fidelity and Guar, v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856
F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988), another case cited by Transamerica,
coal dust was generated by the normal operation of Star Fire's
business and was routinely discharged on a regular, continuing
basis.

The court held that this discharge was not "sudden"

because "sudden" meant "happening without previous notice or
with very brief notice", and concluded:
Thus, we believe that such pollution exclusion
clauses apply to the release of wastes and
pollutants taking place on a regular basis or in
the ordinary course of business.
[856 F,2d at 35]
Transamerica

emphasizes

Judge

Jenkins1

decision

in

Hartford Ace. & Indem. Corp. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. ,
(U.S.D.C.

Central

District

of

Utah,

Case

No.

88-C-1051J)

(available at 5 Mealey's Lit. Rep. Insurance (Mealey) No. 18,
3/12/91 at B-l).

Transamerica!s emphasis is surprising.

In

Hartford, the pollution had occurred over fifteen years in the
normal course of business.

Judge Jenkins defined "sudden" to

mean "happening without notice and occurring by chance" and
simply ruled that the regular, continuous and routine discharge
of

pollutants

over

fifteen

years

accidental."
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was

not

"sudden

and

In Transamerica Ins. Co, v. Sunnes, 711 P.2d 212 (Ore.
1985) , another case relied upon by Transamerica, the court
construed the very Transamerica policy provisions at issue in
the present case.

In Sunnes. the insured had intentionally

discharged waste materials regularly over a period of many years
so the court found the discharge was not "sudden11 and that the
exception to the pollution exclusion did not apply. However, in
so ruling, the court made the following comment about the
pollution exclusion:
The sense of the cases is that the pollution
exclusion clause is designed to exclude coverage
for
occurrences
in
which
pollutants
are
intentionally discharged, whether or not they are
believed to be deleterious, while the exception
Ti.e. "sudden and accidental"] provides coverage
when the discharge of pollutants is not intended by
the insured. The exception to the exclusion clause
is concerned only with whether the discharge or
release of pollutants is accidental or intended.
.

. .

[711 P.2d at 214]

[Emphasis added]

Transamerica places importance on Waste Management v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986).

However, in that

case, the polluter intentionally dumped contaminating materials
at a landfill over a number of years during the normal course of
its business.
Similarly, in F.L. Aerospace v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.,
897 F.2d

214

(6th Cir.

1990),

cited by Transamerica, the

polluter had intentionally transported liquid waste for storage
during the normal course of its business for a period of
approximately 2 1/2 years and it was alleged that the waste had
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contaminated
judgment

adjoining

of the

property.

district

court

The

court

that there

affirmed

was

no

the

coverage

because the polluter had presented no evidence as to how the
contamination occurred.
Every case relied upon by Transamerica in which a court
has rejected coverage for a pollution spill involved industrial
pollution where the polluter intentionally discharged pollutants
into the environment in the regular course of its business over
a period of years and then sought protection under an insurance
policy when faced with cleaning up or paying damages for the
intentional pollution.

See, Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v.

Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. 1988).
not

surprising

Under such facts, it is

that the courts held the polluters were not

entitled to protection under the insurance policies and that the
pollution discharges were not s-udden under any sense of the
word.
The

facts

of the present

case

are, of

course,

far

different that the industrial polluter cases relied upon by
Transamerica.

Gridley

Associates

did

not

intentionally

discharge gas into the ground during the normal course of its
business.

Rather, the discharge was an accident and resulted

from a sudden break of a metal underground gas line caused by
some type of earth movement continuing undetected
months.
notice

Clearly,
or

with

the gas
very

spill

brief
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"happened
notice"

or

for 2 1/2

without

previous

"abruptly"

or

"unexpectedly11 and is therefore covered under either line of
cases discussed above.
Transamerica
Gridley

spill

appears

commenced

to

argue

suddenly,

that

the

even

spill

though

is not

covered

because it only continued each time the pump was activated.
cases don't support such hair-splitting.

the

If a spill

The

starts

"suddenly", it isn't turned into a gradual spill because the
spill consists of a series of sudden discharges when a pump is
activated.

Further, it makes no sense to hold that whether a

spill is "sudden" depends on which side of a valve a gas line
breaks; if the line breaks on one side of the valve so the spill
continues uninterrupted it is sudden, but if the break is on the
other side of the valve so that the spill only continues when
the valve is turned on the spill is not sudden.
Realizing

that

the

cases, rejecting

coverage

for

pollution all involved discharges occurring during the regular
course

of

attempts

business

to

argue

of

the

insured,

Transamerica

in this case that the

Gridley

incredibly
gas

spill

occurred simply B S part of the normal business operations of the
Gridley station.

To characterize a sudden gas line break caused

by movement of the earth in that manner is a little like calling
a woodpecker a carpenter.

Presumably, Transamerica would also

argue that if a gas explosion occurred as a result of a customer
smoking while filling his gas tank, the explosion was just a
part of the normal operation of the business.

34

Transamerica asserts that the case of Industrial Indem.
Ins. v. Crown Auto Dealerships. 731 F.Supp 1517 (M.D.Fla. 1990)
(the one case from which Transamerica recites any of the facts)
is "very similar" to the case at bar.

In truth, the facts of

the Industrial Indemnity case were far different.

There, as a

routine part of its business, the polluter continually poured
oil into used oil holding tanks over a period of years.
employees routinely

The

spilled small amounts of oil during the

process of filling up the tanks.

There were also occasional

spills due to leaking hoses and pipe connections.

Apparently

the polluter did not take appropriate action to cleanup the
spills

as

they

occurred

gradually built up.

and

over

the

years

the

pollution

The court found that these spills occurring

during the normal course of the daily business over a period of
years

were

not

"sudden

and

accidental."

The

Industrial

Indemnity case may be similar to a situation where gas station
employees or customers regularly spill
while

they

are

filling

up their gas

small amounts of gas
tanks, but

it

is

far

different from the present spill which was caused by a "sudden
and accidental" break in an underground gas line.

3.

The Fact that the Gridlev Spill Continued Undetected

For 2 1/2 Months Does Not Mean the Spill Was Not Sudden.

Transamerica urges the court to rule that a gas spill
cannot 'be "sudden" unless it lasts only for a brief period of
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time.

Such a definition is not in accordance with the primary

dictionary

definition

("happening without previous notice or

with very brief notice; unexpected, unprepared for11) or with the
overwhelming case law.

As the cases cited above demonstrate, a

"sudden" discharge may continue for a substantial period of time
and is not limited to an instantaneous happening.

See, e.g.,

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 603
The

focus

of the

courts has been

on whether the

(1980).

discharge

started suddenly, not how long it lasted.
For
N.W.2d

683

example,

in Just v.

Land Reclamation

Ltd. , 445

(Wis. 1989), the insured was sued for discharging

pollution consisting of airborne dust and debris, noise, odor,
and contaminated water in the course of its landfill business
over a period of time.

The complaint against the insured did

not allege any dates of the alleged polluting events during the
policy period, nor did the complaint allege how the pollutants
were released into the environment.

The court held there was no

"sudden and accidental" event and denied coverage, observing:
When policies limit coverage to sudden and
accidental events, Wisconsin courts l i n t coverage
to "injuries caused by a sudden and identifiable
event with respect to both location and time."
[Citations
omitted]
The
term
"sudden
and
accidental" does not apply to pollution damage
occurring over a substantial period of time.
[Citation omitted] There must be an accidental and
"immediate"
discharge.
[Citation
omitted]
"Sudden" is defined temporally and not in terms of
unexpectedness.
[445 N.W.2d at 686]
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Although the quoted language seems at first glance to
lend some support to Transamericaf s argument

in the present

case, the Just court went on to distinguish its earlier decision
in Wagner v. Milwaukee Hut. Ins. Co., 427 N.W.2d 854 (Wis. 1988)
because in Wagner the accident caused the discharge to begin
immediately even though the discharge continued over a number of
years.

In other words, the commencement of the spill had been

"sudden."
In Wagner, a case directly on point, an underground gas
line at a self-service station was broken by construction work
and leaked gas for three years before the break was discovered.
The court held the spill was "sudden" and thus covered under the
policy, saying:
Milwaukee Mutual . . . argues the discharge
was not "sudden" because it occurred over a
"substantial period of time." [Citations omitted]
. . . Milwaukee Mutual reasons that even though the
injury to the pipe may have been immediate, the
discharge itself accumulated over a course of three
years. . . .
We reject Milwaukee Mutual's position for
several reasons. First, the discharge of gasoline
was sudden. . . . The gasoline began leaking
immediately after the pipe was damaged in 1981, and
continued until it was discovered in 1984. . . .
The length of time that elapsed before the leak was
discovered is irrelevant to the suddenness of the
discharge. The pollution exclusion clause does not
preclude coverage where there is a sudden damage
to a pipe and an immediate discharge of pollutants
that continues uninterrupted for a prolonged period
of time.
[427 N.W.2d at 857]

[Emphasis added]

In Lumbermans Mut. Cas. v. Bellville Ind., 555 N.E.2d
568 (Mass. 1990), another case upon which Transamerica places
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emphasis, Bellville was sued

for contaminating New Bedford

Harbor with PCBs used in its manufacturing plant in the mid
1970s.

The United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts had certified to the Massachusetts Supreme Court
the issue of the meaning of "sudden" as used in the pollution
exclusion.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court did not have before

it the precise facts concerning the discharge of pollutants so
it could not determine whether the discharge had been "sudden."
The court did not rule that the length of time the discharge
lasted was relevant.

Rather, the court said:

Surely, the abruptness of the commencement of
the release or discharge of the pollutant is the
crucial element.
[555 N.E.2d at 572] [Emphasis added]
Only a very few cases have stated any requirement that
a pollution discharge last for only a short period of time in
order to be a "sudden" discharge.

It is respectfully submitted

that this court should reject any such requirement in accordance
with the decisions of the vast majority of the cases. Moreover,
these few cases did not even attempt to define what a "short
period of time" means and they are all distinguishable from the
case at bar.
For example, Transamerica relies heavily on Fireman's
Fund

Ins.

Companies

(E.D.Mich. 1988).

v.

Ex-cell-o

Corp.,

702

F.Supp

1317

That court had no facts before it so it was

not called upon to nor did it decide whether the discharge in
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that case was covered under the policy, nor did the court make
any effort to define what a "short time" was.
Transamerica also relies on Technicon Electronics Corp.
v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y.
App.

Div. 1988), aff f d, 74 N.Y.2d 66, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 542

N.E.2d

1048

(1989).

That

case

involved

a

manufacturer's

intentional discharge of toxic wastes over several years during
the

regular

recognized

course

and

of

its

business.

distinguished

The

Technicon

the previous New York

court

case of

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., supra, where the court had
stated

that the

discharge

discharge continued
time.11

could

"undetected

be

sudden

even

for a substantial

though

the

period of

[533 N.Y.S.2d at 99]
Transamerica also points to the case of 01 in Corporation

v.

Insurance

Company

(S.D.N.Y., April

of

North- America,

23, 1991) which again

No.

84

involved

Civ.

1968

intentional

dumping of pollutants over many years during the regular course
of business.

The Olin court stated that "no use of the word

•sudden1 or 'suddenly1 could be consistent with an event which
happened gradually over an extended period of time.

. . . "

Transamerica has not and cannot point to one case which
even implies that a gasoline spill which starts suddenly and
accidentally

is not covered just because it continues for a

period of 2 1/2 months undetected.
reject such a notion.
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The cases, in fact, clearly

For this court to limit the definition of "sudden" to
spills which continue only a brief time would also lead to
uncertain and arbitrary results.

The important fact in this

case is whether the commencement of the spill when the gas line
broke was sudden (which it admittedly was) , not how long the
spill continued. If Transamericafs proposed standard is adopted,
how long could a pollution spill continue after an accident and
still be within the coverage of the insurance policy?

For

example, when the Exxon Valdez crashed, would the portion of the
spill which occurred during the first few minutes or the first
few hours only be covered, or would the portion of the oil spill
which occurred over a matter of weeks be covered, or would the
entire spill be excluded because it occurred over more than a
"brief11 period of time?

In the case at bar, would only that

portion of the gas spilling within the first few minutes after
the line break be covered or the first few days or the first few
weeks?

Or, because the spill continued for more than a "brief"

period

of

coverage?

time, would

the

entire

spill

be

excluded

from

How would you determine which gas leaked when as far

as Transamerica's obligation to clean up the gas is concerned?
How would you determine what damage to surrounding property was
caused by the portion of the gas that leaked during the time
period which the court determined to be "sudden?"
Finally,

Transamerica's

own

interpretation

of

the

"sudden" exception to the pollution exclusion is relevant to
determining the meaning of that term in Transamerica's policy.
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The undisputed evidence in the court below was that Transamerica
consciously determined that it could not assert the Gridley
spill was not "sudden" and instead agreed to provide coverage.
For three years thereafter,

Transamerica did not contend the

spill was not "sudden."
For all of these reasons, the district court correctly
determined the gasoline spill in this action was "sudden" as a
matter of law.

B.

TRANSAMERICA IS BARRED FROM DENYING COVERAGE ON THE

BASIS THAT THE GRIDLEY SPILL WAS NOT "SUDDEN."

1. Transamerica Did Not Raise the "Sudden" Argument For
Three Years After the Spill.
As set forth at length in Gridley Associates1 Statement
of Facts [pp. 8-16, supra], the undisputed evidence before the
district

court

consisting

entirely

of

Transamericafs

own

correspondence and pleadings demonstrated that although during
the years after the Gridley Spill, Transamerica through three
different coverage counsel threw out any number of reasons the
gasoline spill purportedly was not covered under the Policy,
Transamerica never contended that the spill was not "sudden"
until over three years after the spill was discovered, when in
April,

1989,

shortly

before

the

scheduled

trial

date,

Transamerica filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Transamerica did not even raise this contention in its Answers
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